Preamble

The House met at Eleven o'clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

PRIVATE BUSINESS

FALMOUTH DOCKS BILL [Lords]

Read the Third time and passed, without Amendment.

Orders of the Day — TRIBUNALS AND INQUIRIES BILL [Lords]

As amended (in the Standing Committee), considered.

Clause 2.—(REPORTS OF, AND REFERENCES TO, COUNCIL AND SCOTTISH COMMITTEE.)

11.5 a.m.

The Attorney-General (Sir Reginald Manningham-Buller): I beg to move, in page 3, line 10, to leave out "particular."
It might be convenient for the House to consider at the same time the Amendments in page 3, lines 12, 23, and 33, if you would permit it, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Speaker: Yes.

The Attorney-General: All these Amendments are consequential upon an Amendment made in Committee, when the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Newport (Sir F. Soskice) will remember that an Amendment to leave out the word "particular" in Clause 1 was accepted by the Government. These Amendments are necessary in consequence of that Amendment. They are all in the drafting category.

Amendment agreed to.

Further Amendments made: In page 3, line 12, leave out "particular."

In page 3, line 23, leave out "a particular matter" and insert
any such matter as is mentioned in paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of section one of this Act.

In page 3, line 33, leave out "particular."—[The Attorney-General.]

Clause 9.—(APPEALS FROM CERTAIN TRIBUNALS.)

The Attorney-General: I beg to move, in page 8, line 31, to leave out subsection (5).
This subsection was the subject of considerable discussion in Committee, and my right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Advocate then said that consideration would be given to the matter. The Report of the Franks Committee suggested that there should be only a limited right of appeal, but on further consideration we have come to the conclusion that we ought not to restrict or abolish the possibility of an appeal in certain cases from the Court of Appeal to the House of Lords.
It is conceivable that there might be a conflict between a Scottish decision and an English decision of the Court of Appeal, and it would be unfortunate if that could not be resolved by a further appeal. One also might get the situation which arose quite recently in relation to tax legislation. A case came before the English Court of Appeal in which the court felt itself bound by one of its own previous decisions, but at the same time it pretty clearly intimated that it thought that the previous decision was wrong. It was, however, bound to follow the decision because it was binding upon the Court of Appeal. In that case, there was an appeal to the House of Lords, and the result was that the House of Lords held that the Court of Appeal's first view was correct.
It is conceivable that that situation might arise again, and therefore on further reflection we feel that it is desirable that there should be a right of appeal with leave to the House of Lords. I apprehend, although, of course, it is not for me to say, that having regard to the chain of appeals that will take place in many cases before a case ever gets to the Court of Appeal, there would be considerable reluctance, both on the part of the Court of Appeal and on the part of the House of Lords, to give leave to appeal to the House of Lords unless the circumstances of the case clearly warrant that further appeal. Therefore, we feel that it is safe in this instance to depart from the suggestion contained in the Franks Report.

Sir Frank Soskice: I rise only to thank the Attorney-General for


having moved the Amendment. I agree with him, and I think that the Committee upstairs agreed with him, that the question is nicely balanced, but on balance I certainly think that the Government are right in deciding on this occasion to depart from the recommendation of the Franks Committee. There is, after all, the safeguard of the leave of the Court of Appeal or the House of Lords which has to be obtained before an appeal can be taken to the House of Lords. I agree with the Attorney-General that that should be an adequate safeguard against an undue multiplication of appeals.
I notice that there is in the name of the Lord Advocate an Amendment in page 9, line 24. I do not know whether it would be convenient for the Attorney-General, if he may speak for his right hon. and learned Friend, to say that that is simply a consequential Amendment which is rendered necessary because of the differing procedure of the Scots law from that of the English law.

Mr. David Weitzman: This was an important matter and it was discussed in detail in Committee. I am grateful that the Government have given very careful consideration to what is an important matter and I am glad that they have come to this decision.

Amendment agreed to.

The Solicitor-General for Scotland (Mr. William Grant): I beg to move, in page 9, line 24, at the end, to insert:
and
(c) an appeal shall lie, with the leave of of the Court of Session or of the House of Lords, from any decision of the Court of Session under this section, and such leave may be given on such terms as to costs or otherwise as the Court of Session or the House of Lords may determine".
This is the Scottish corollary to the Amendment which the House has just accepted. Broadly speaking in Scotland leave is not needed to appeal to the House of Lords. If there is an appeal following a final judgment, it may be taken without leave. It has been felt—I think, rightly—that in cases such as these what might be frivolous appeals should be discouraged. In this Bill, it is advisable to have the rights of appeal similar in the two countries.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 12.—(REASONS TO BE GIVEN FOR DECISIONS OF TRIBUNALS AND MINISTERS.)

The Attorney-General: I beg to move, in page 11, line 44, at the end, to insert:
(3) Amy statement of the reasons for such a decision as is mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection (1) of this section, whether given in pursuance of that subsection or of any other statutory provision, shall be taken to form part of the decision and accordingly to be incorporated in the record.
This Amendment arises from our discussions in Committee. The right hon. and learned Member for Newport (Sir F. Soskice) at that time posed a question as to whether any distinction was to be drawn in relation to certiorari proceedings between an oral statement of reasons and a written statement of reasons. As I undertook to do, concerning all the points raised during our discussions, we have given further consideration to that and to many other matters.
We have felt that there is doubt whether reasons under the existing law, whether stated orally or in writing, can always be regarded as forming part of the record of proceedings. As the right hon. and learned Gentleman knows, certiorari will lie only where there is something obviously wrong on the record of proceedings. Bearing in mind the doubt which exists concerning that as to whether in all cases the reasons could be held to form part of the record, we thought that we had better remove that doubt by this provision to make it clear that the statement of reasons, whether oral or in writing, should be deemed to be part of the record and so make it possible to bring certiorari proceedings. This is a provision for the removal of doubt, and I commend it to the House.

Sir F. Soskice: Again I express my gratitude to the Attorney-General. He disposes, to my satisfaction at least, of the lingering doubt which a number of us felt in Committee. As was previously indicated, the purpose of the Clause is twofold. One of the purposes is to ensure that there shall be an untrammelled power in the courts to consider these decisions by way of certiorari. As the Attorney-General has indicated, there was a twofold doubt: first, whether a verbal statement of reasons would suffice, and secondly, the doubt that might arise whether in all cases reasons could be


regarded as part of the record for the purpose of certiorari proceedings. The language that the Attorney-General has chosen disposes completely of the difficulty and this is a distinct improvement in the Bill. I am grateful to the right hon. and learned Gentleman for the step he has taken.

Amendment agreed to.

Second Schedule.—(ENACTMENTS REPEALED.)

11.15 a.m.

The Joint Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. David Renton): I beg to move, in page 20, line 30, column 3, to leave out "paragraph 6".
Paragraph 6 is one of a number of paragraphs in Part I of the First Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1952, which were included in the repeal Schedule of the Bill as a result of a new Clause which I moved, in which, among other things, the property qualification of the General Commissioners of Income Tax was removed. On further consideration since the Committee stage, it has been found that the repeal of that paragraph of the First Schedule of the Income Tax Act, 1952, would cause difficulty in Scotland. We are therefore suggesting that that repeal should be deleted so that the paragraph will stand.
So that the House may be fully seized of the matter, I should draw attention to paragraph 6. It states that if a sufficient number of duly qualified persons to be chosen, either to act as General Commissioners or to supply vacancies, cannot be found for any city division, any person qualified to act for the county division in or adjoining which the city division is situate may be chosen for the city division. That allows for flexibility, and it allows a practical difficulty to be overcome on certain occasions. It would be a pity if we repealed the paragraph, because the machinery which it contains could no longer be used.

Sir F. Soskice: I do not demur, but I would like to raise a question which arises from what the Joint Under-Secretary has said. In the case where it is necessary, to have recourse to outside assistants, if I may so briefly term them, those outside assistants who would be called in on an occasion of that sort

would still be required to have the property qualification which it was the objective of the Government to remove. If so, it is perhaps a little unfortunate in that the Government do not wholly achieve the purpose which they have in mind of wholly discarding a property qualification in the appointment of commissioners.
If that is the necessary consequence of the step which the Government have taken, and if, after all, leaving in the paragraph simply provides as it were a kind of safety valve where there is an insufficiency of persons to man the Commissioners, I suppose that the only thing one can do is to accept it. It is, however, right to call attention to the fact that in that case, which, we hope, will not be frequent, the property qualification will still be applicable.

Mr. Renton: The position, as I understand it, is that these people would not be required to have the property qualification—the property qualification has been abolished. Nevertheless, suitable people must be found, and if they cannot be found in the area in which they have to sit, it is necessary to go outside to other areas. At least in Scotland that has been found to be the case, particularly concerning the cities of Edinburgh and Glasgow. The Amendment will give flexibility in that so far as those two cities are concerned it will be permissible, if necessary, to recruit the General Commissioners from county areas outside, which would not normally be the rule. It is only exceptionally that that would happen.

Sir F. Soskice: May I say another word? I should be grateful if the Government would think over this problem a little further at a later stage in the history of the Bill. A possibly anomalous position will arise if one lot of Commissioners do not require the property qualifications but others who have been recruited from outside still are required to possess it.

The Solicitor-General for Scotland: indicated dissent.

Sir F. Soskice: I see that the right hon. and learned Gentleman shakes his head. Perhaps I have misconceived the situation and it is a purely Scottish one. If the right hon. and learned Gentleman would say that he will give further consideration


to that matter, I would feel gratified. It might possibly be dealt with by inserting at an appropriate place in the Bill a provision which, broadly, would have the effect that if outside assistance is called for, the outside assistants shall not be disqualified if they do not possess the necessary property qualifications. I can conceive, particularly in the large cities to which the hon. and learned Gentleman referred, the possibly almost ridiculous situation arising, that we may have a number of General Commissioners, some recruited from outside, some not recruited from outside, some required to have a property qualification, others not.
It may be that I have misconceived the situation, and in a matter of Scots law I am only too ready to think that probably, indeed very probably, that is the case; but if I have correctly stated the position I should have thought it a little unfortunate that there should be that duality of qualification requisite in the manning of the bodies of Commissioners. While I would not ask the House to oppose the Amendment, I should be gratified if the Solicitor-General for Scotland would say that he will give it further thought in order to try to prevent the anomaly, if there is an anomaly, which I have indicated.

The Solicitor-General for Scotland: I think I can set the right hon. and learned Gentleman's mind at ease. Clause 7 (2) still stands, and so the property qualification is abolished for all General Commissioners. What we are doing by this Amendment is to ensure that in two particular cases where they are rather thin on the ground we can go outside the area in order to appoint General Commissioners from outside, but the overriding consideration still applies, that those outside Commissioners do not have to have a property qualification.

Amendment agreed to.

11.22 a.m.

The Attorney-General: I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
I do not think the House will expect or indeed require me to make anything like a long speech in moving the Third Reading of this important Bill. We have had very full discussions in the House of the whole of the Franks Report and we had a very useful debate on Second Reading of this Bill, and there

were very valuable discussions in consideration of it, and valuable suggestions made, by both sides in Committee on the Bill. I should not like it to be felt though that because the remarks I propose to make are brief in character we do not regard this as an important Measure, for it is. It really is the keystone for the implementation of a great many of the recommendations of the Franks Report which, as the Government have already made clear, they have accepted.
Under this Bill the Council on Tribunals will be constituted, and that Council will have a great deal of work to do. The work that that Council does will lead in due course to more work being done in this House in implementing its recommendations in relation to the codes of procedure and in relation to the various other questions it has to consider. I trust it will not be inappropriate if I express the hope that it will be able to make fairly rapid progress with the many tasks which will fall upon its shoulders as soon as the members of the Council are appointed. So far as one can see they will have a very heavy amount of work to do, in the first few years of their existence at least; but when that work is done they will continue to have the important duty of keeping what is happening under review.
I do not think the House would require me now, in moving the Third Reading, to go into any detail of what the Bill contains. I commend it to the House, and I should like to conclude by thanking my right hon. and hon. Friends and the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Newport (Sir F. Soskice) and his hon. Friends for their assistance in securing the passage of this important Measure.

11.25 a.m.

Sir F. Soskice: I should like to express my gratitude to the Attorney-General for what he has just said about the participation of my right hon. and hon. Friends in the passing of this Bill.
It is, as the Attorney-General has intimated, in a sense a co-operative effort. It deals with doubts and anxieties which have been felt on both sides of the House and which were exhaustively reviewed and considered in the extremely valuable Report of the Franks Committee. As the Attorney-General has said, it should not be thought that we think any less


of the influence the machinery the Government are to set up will have in the future development of these tribunals and inquiries if we do not spend long on the Third Reading of the Bill. If we discuss the Third Reading at perhaps rather less than the customary length appropriate to a Bill of this importance, that is perhaps to be attributed to the fact in the first place that the problems with which we have dealt were most exhaustively considered by the Franks Committee, and secondly, as the Attorney-General has said, that we very fully examined them and the detailed proposals of the Government during Committee on the Bill.
The House has now decided upon the form of the Bill. Speaking for myself I still feel a little anxiety as to whether the functioning of the Council may not be a little too weighted on the side of the tribunals as distinct from the inquiries. That is a view which was put from our side of the Committee, and the House has now taken a decision upon it.
I would express the hope that the functioning of the Council will meet the expectations which we all entertain of the progressive improvement and perhaps also the standardisation of the proceedings both of tribunals and inquiries. If it is not disrespectful to the future membership of the Council to do so perhaps I may use the adage that the proof of the pudding will be in the eating. We hope that practice will show and experience will demonstrate that the Council is in a position, in its constitution and in the circumstances in which it works, to exercise the general supervision over the inquiries and over the proceedings of tribunals which we hope it will be able to exercise.
I think that at this stage I cannot carry the matter farther. I feel that this House will watch with interest, sometimes with anxiety, always with attention, the proceedings of the Council and its interventions where necessary and its constant vigilance, which I feel sure we all expect from it, and which I feel sure will be exercised by it.

11.28 a.m.

Sir Lionel Heald: Before we pass the Bill, perhaps it would be appropriate that a back bencher on this side of

the House should just say a word or two about it, and I hope it will not be considered out of place if a back bencher does so as one who did not have the privilege of sitting in Committee on the Bill. I think it is right to say that we do owe a debt of gratitude to all those who have taken part in the discussion of this matter in Committee and made some valuable improvements in the Bill.
One unfortunate thing about this Bill at this time is that it is necessarily of a complicated and technical character. It is not easy for the general public outside the House to appreciate just what it does and how important it is. I very much hope that it will be appreciated how very valuable this Bill is to the subject, his rights and liberties.
Some of us on this side of the House, and, of course, on the other side of the House too, though I speak particularly for back benchers on this side, have been concerned with this matter now for some years. It was in 1954 when some of us first made ourselves perhaps a little unpopular by being a little pressing about it. Since then the matter has been pursued, and I think it is generally accepted now that we are dealing with something which is of great public importance.
Unfortunately, owing to the technical matters involved, there is, I find, a tendency rather to think that this is some minor technical alteration which is being made in a highly complicated procedure. It is nothing of the kind, of course, and I hope that full appreciation will be given to the Government for having tackled what is a really serious problem which has caused real public dissatisfaction in many directions. I hope that that will be generally understood.
The Bill gives effect very largely to the Franks Committee recommendations, but we must remember and frankly admit that the Committee's terms of reference were definitely limited. It must not be thought that the Bill either purports to deal with or can deal with a large number of problems relating to the rights and liberties of the subject which are necessarily excluded from the ambit of any Bill based on recommendations of that nature.
It would not be proper for me to go into all those matters, but we have certain things in mind and it is right that the


public, who are not very well acquainted with the niceties of the subject, should appreciate that the Bill does not purport to be a general provision dealing with all outstanding problems of the liberties of the subject. The Bill deals with them within a certain compass, and I sincerely believe that it will be found in practice to alleviate some of the complaints of hardship that we have had over many years now. I hope, for that reason, that when the Bill becomes law it will receive a very warm welcome.

11.32 a.m.

Mr. Weitzman: Like many hon. Members on both sides of the House, I too have been very interested in this Measure. I believe that it is the first practical step in legislative form to put into effect the main recommendations of the Franks Committee. I am very much in agreement with what has just been said by the right hon. and learned Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald).
I would point out the very glaring fact that the Press, very properly in most cases, is always ready to expose errors of bureaucratic zeal, over-interference by the State in the rights of the individual and encroachments upon the liberty of the subject, but when a Measure of this kind comes along, which is a real effort to deal with these problems, very little publicity is given to it. That is unfortunate. I am grateful to the Government for having tackled the problem in this way. It is extremely important that the greatest publicity should be given to this Measure, because it is so important that the citizen should be aware of his rights and what is being done to secure them.
I am glad to see written into the Bill a Clause requiring reasons to be given for decisions of tribunals and Ministers. That is all-important because, first, it requires the judicial body or the person arriving at the decision to give reasons and, secondly, which is perhaps still more important, it enables the citizen to know the grounds on which the decision has been made so that an appeal can be properly made if the party so desires.
I should have liked written into the Bill a Clause requiring the holding of an inquiry in public unless there was good reason to do otherwise. This will depend

now on the decision of the Council on Tribunals. Indeed, as the Attorney-General has indicated, a good deal will depend on how that Council will tackle its job. On Second Reading and in Committee there was considerable criticism of the omission of administrative procedures from the necessity of review as in the case of tribunals. I am glad to think, however, that the Council on. Tribunals will have power to deal with them under Clause 1 (1, c).
I hope that it will exercise that power very fully. Much will rest upon the manner in which the Council exercises the power and upon the codes of procedure which it will draw up. These are vital matters. I hope that the Council will deal in a realistic way with them and with the other problems which form part of its work. The success of this effort to put into real effect the recommendations of the Franks Committee must depend on how the Council on Tribunals will deal with the problem.
I hope, also, that the Bill will be, as is foreshadowed, a first instalment in safeguarding the rights of the individual. It is a very important Measure which should have far-reaching effects. I hope that further instalments will not be long delayed, and I have great pleasure in supporting the Third Reading.

11.35 a.m.

Mr. Gilbert Longden: I wish to give a brief welcome to the Bill because it fell to my lot, in the literal sense of that phrase, to move a Motion in the House on 25th March, 1955, about all these matters which are causing us such anxiety when the interests of the individual conflict, as they must in modern society, with those of the State and thereby require that we should take the utmost pains to see that fairness is the lot of the individual.
I wish very respectfully to congratulate and thank my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General and the Government for having, first of all, appointed the Franks Committee and then introduced the Measure. As has been said, it does not go all the way, but it would be ungenerous to cavil at that. I conclude by quoting from the words of the present Minister of Housing and Local Government, who wound up on


the occasion of the debate of my Motion by saying:
The search for perfect justice never ends, and I trust that the House will pursue that search without cessation."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 25th March, 1955; Vol. 538, c. 2527–8.]

11.36 a.m.

Mr. Douglas Houghton: I fully support the opinions expressed about the importance of the Bill. Both my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Newport (Sir F. Soskice) and the right hon. and learned Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald) referred to the lack of public interest in the Bill. Unfortunately, that must be accepted. The public are interested when things go wrong. They are not so interested when the House is trying to put them right. We must find satisfaction in well-doing for its own sake in the House on these occasions.
The importance of the Bill goes beyond its boundaries, in corresponding changes in Departmental procedures connected with inquiries held under the auspices of various Ministries. More disclosures of the reports of inspectors, more fresh air in the form of investigation, would be all to the good, but it was not found necessary to incorporate all these changes in the Bill.
I pass to Clause 7 of the Bill and I hope that I shall be guided by the Chair if I stray beyond the rules of order. Clause 7 is a newcomer to the Bill and is an offshoot of our discussions on the Finance Bill. It was added in Committee at its final session on the 17th of this month. It deals with matters connected with the property qualifications of General and Additional Commissioners of Income Tax and with the method of appointment of General Commissioners of Income Tax. It does not implement any recommendation by the Franks Committee. That Committee's Report referred to General Commissioners of Income Tax, but made no recommendations about their method of appointment or about the qualifications which the Income Tax Act required the Commissioners to possess as a condition of appointment.
The working of these bodies is, quite properly, brought within the scope of the Council on Tribunals, but the constitution and the qualifications for appointment were not dealt with in the Franks Report. They were dealt with in the

Report of the Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income, generally referred to as the Radcliffe Commission. In debates on the Finance Bill the Financial Secretary said in connection with a proposed Clause that the Government intended to implement the recommendations of the Radcliffe Commission and had decided, on balance, that it would be more convenient to deal with the matter in this Bill rather than to add a new Section to the Income Tax Act, 1952.
At the time I was not sure why it should be regarded as more convenient to deal with the matter in that way, unless it was solely from the point of view of time. After all, there is no particular convenience in taking something out of the Income Tax Act and amending it in this Bill when the Income Tax Act itself was open to amendment at the time when the decision was taken. I assumed that the only reason for bringing Clause 7 into this Bill was that there was not time to deal with a corresponding Clause on the Report stage of the Finance Bill. Yet I notice that the Report stage of the Finance Bill was taken on 15th and 16th July and that the very next morning Clause 7 was added to this Bill.
In a very brief speech made by the Joint Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department which, with great respect to the members of the Committee, I would say that nobody understood, the Minister got away with it far more easily in the Committee upstairs than would have been possible had it been proposed either as an addition to the Finance Bill or to this Bill had it been discussed on the Floor of the House. I am surprised that twenty-four hours made so much difference to the destination of the proposal now embodied in Clause 7.
However, who am I to complain that it appears here, when it is the reform that matters, and the reform is a subject upon which I have expressed opinions at different times. The property qualification of General Commissioners of Income Tax has remained unchanged since 1842, and this morning we are about to abolish it. That deserves some mention, if not celebration. That this qualification, which generally amounts to the possession of £5,000 real estate or £200 a year from personal or real estate, has endured so long in this democratic age is a matter of surprise.
I have referred on other occasions to the length of time it has taken to get this important reform implemented on the recommendation of various bodies which have considered the matter. I wish now to draw attention to the fact that this Clause does not do all that the Radcliffe Commission recommended should be done. It proposes to substitute the right of appointment by the Lord Chancellor in those cases—and as I read it, those cases only—where the right of appointment of General Commissioners of Income Tax now rests in the hands of the Land Tax Commissioners.
For example, it makes no proposals regarding Scotland. I make no complaint about that, because the Radcliffe Commission saw no reason to change the position in Scotland. The new Clause, however, proposes to deal with England and Wales and it distinguishes between those cases where the Land Tax Commissioners have the right of appointment and other cases where magistrates and other bodies have the right of appointment, as in the case of certain cities in England and Wales. We now have the rather extraordinary position that this Bill deals with the right of appointment only where the right of appointment rested in the hands of the Land Tax Commissioners, and Part II of the First Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1952, deals with the appointment of Commissioners in places other than those in which the Land Tax Commissioners have the right of appointment.
That, I suggest, leaves the law in rather an untidy state and also, of course, raises the question why the right of appointment has not been transferred to the Lord Chancellor under Clause 7 of this Bill in the cases covered by Part II of the First Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1952, where the right of appointment rests, in such cities as Birmingham, Bristol, Exeter and so forth, in the hands of authorities other than the Land Tax Commissioners. My first point then, is that the Clause does not make a clean job of it; it does not do what the Radcliffe Commission said should be done in England and Wales.
My other point is what I would describe as the mutilation of the Income Tax Act which the Clause inflicts. This matter really relates to the Income Tax Act and

not to this Bill, but, for the reasons I have gone into, it is in this Bill and not elsewhere. Part I of the First Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1952, is in a most ragged state. It is almost incoherent now about this matter and there are some important questions which will arise—probably not on this Bill but at another time and elsewhere—on how the two laws are to be brought together.
I can see, Mr. Speaker, that I ought not to pursue this matter any further but I should like to leave these comments on the record, because at some time and somewhere the matter will need attention. Having said that, and because I do not want to leave the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney-General or the Joint Under-Secretary under any misapprehension about my views on the Clause, I fully support what it does. It is a step in the right direction. Under this Bill we shall now have the power conferred upon the Lord Chancellor to select, on proper advice, persons of repute with special personal qualities to act as General Commissioners of Income Tax who do not possess, never have possessed, and never would possess the property qualifications which hitherto the Income Tax Act has required them to have as a condition of appointment.
Monied men are not always the best judges of other monied men, and the landed gentry, as most of the General Commissioners are, are not, with great respect, necessarily the only people to sit in judgment on the tax affairs of their fellow citizens, be they traders, wage earners or salary earners, who might have recourse to the additional Commissioners for the purpose of settling a dispute with the Inland Revenue.
In general, the Bill does a most important job. It sets up a Council on Tribunals to review the constitution and working of a variety of bodies put there by this House as protection for the citizen against arbitrary or unfair decisions by bureaucracy. That is a most important change in our general procedure in connection with tribunals of this kind.
I have spoken for long enough on the Third Reading of this Bill, but this is one of the occasions on which an hon. Member who has been denied the opportunity of dealing with some of these matters in the place where and when they should be dealt with is left with very


little scope for bringing any knowledge which he has to bear on the topic when the Bill has reached its final stage.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed, with amendments.

Orders of the Day — WAYS AND MEANS

[23rd July]

ADOPTED CHILDREN (POLICIES OF ASSURANCE.)

Resolution reported,
That any Act of the present Session amending the law relating to the adoption of children may, notwithstanding any resulting charge to estate duty, include provision for validating policies effected before the commencement of that Act for the benefit of adapted children under the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, and the Married Women's Policies of Assurance (Scotland) Act. 1880.—[Mr. Simon.]

Resolution agreed to.

Instructions to any committee to whom the Children Bill [Lords] may be recommitted that they have power to make provision therein pursuant to the said Resolution.

Orders of the Day — CHILDREN BILL [Lords]

Order for consideration, as amended (in the Standing Committee), read.

Bill re-committed to a Committee of the whole House in respect of the Amendments to Clause 22 standing on the Notice Paper in the name of Mr. Secretary Butler.—[Miss Hornsby-Smith.]

Bill immediately considered in Committee.

[Sir CHARLES MACANDREW in the Chair]

Clause 22.—(EFFECTS OF ADOPTION.)

11.52 a.m.

The Joint Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Miss Patricia Hornsby-Smith): I beg to move, in page 13, line 17, after "include", to insert:
and be deemed always to have included
Perhaps I may also refer to the second Amendment, to line 32, inserting two new paragraphs (a) and (b).
These are complicated matters, though I am sure they will have the support of the Committee. Subsection (2) amends Section 11 of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, and Section 2 of the Married Women's Policies of Assurance (Scotland) Act, 1880, so that those Sections apply to adopted children as well as to natural children. Those Sections enable a parent to take out a life assurance policy in favour of a child. When the parent dies, the policy moneys are held in trust for the child, and they are not aggregated with the rest of the assurer's estate for the purposes of Estate Duty. Estate Duty is paid on the policy moneys, but only at the rate appropriate to the amount of the policy moneys regarded as a separate estate.
The Amendment to line 17 makes it clear that the subsection will apply to policies taken out before the Bill comes into operation, and the Amendment to line 32 enables people who adopted a child before 1950 to benefit from the provisions of the subsection.

Mr. William Wells: We agree with this Amendment, and we are very much obliged to the hon. Lady for so courteously giving us notice of her intention to move it.

Amendment agreed to.

Further Amendment made: In page 13, line 32, to leave out from beginning to first "an" in line 33 and insert:
In this section, 'adoption order' in-eludes,—

(a) in subsection (2), an adoption order made under any enactment repealed by the principal Act;
(b) in subsection (3)".—[Miss Hornsby-Smith.]

Clause, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Bill reported, with Amendments; as amended (in the Standing Committee and on recommittal). considered.

Mr. Speaker: The new Clause standing in the name of the right hon. Member for Smethwick (Mr. Gordon Walker) relating to medical examination is out of order in subsection (2) and, therefore, could not be discussed on Report, but I see that there is an Amendment in the name of the right hon. Gentleman the Home Secretary, Clause 19, page 12, line 12, to insert:
as evidenced, in such cases as may be prescribed, by the certificate of a fully registered medical practitioner".
which deals with the matter. When we come to that Amendment, the matter mentioned in subsection (1) of the proposed new Clause may be discussed.

Clause 3.—(DUTY OF PERSONS MAINTAINING FOSTER CHILDREN TO NOTIFY LOCAL AUTHORITY.)

Mr. James MacColl: I beg to move, in page 3, line 35, at the end, to insert:
(3) On receipt of a notice under subsection (1) of this section it shall be the duty of the local authority to inquire whether there is any matter relating to the health of the person giving the notice or of any member of his household that would be detrimental to the child if received as the foster child of the person giving the notice.
This Amendment seeks to insert a new subsection (3) placing upon the local authority the duty of making inquiries from foster parents in regard to the health, not only of the foster parents themselves, but also of any other members of the household. This arises out of a discussion which took place on an Amendment moved in Committee upstairs from my hon. Friend the Member for Barking (Mr. Hastings) particularly relating to tuberculosis. My hon. Friend suggested

that one of the factors that should be taken into account by a children authority in regard to the suitability of foster parents was the question whether or not they suffered from tuberculosis.
The hon. Lady the Joint Under-Secretary herself made two points which I think we agree were important points, carrying particular weight, in view of the hon. Lady's own Departmental experience in the Ministry of Health. The hon. Lady had been criticising the Amendment during the proceedings of the Committee, and she said that it—
would be useless if somebody in the household oher than the foster parents had tuberculosis.
That is the first point she made. The second point, and I am quoting from column 46, was:
If we are going into medical grounds, we should consider a much wider field than has been considered in the Amendment.
Later, at the foot of column 46, she gave an undertaking, saying:
Would the hon. Member be content if I gave an undertaking to consider this matter again before Report to see whether we can meet the point that he has in mind?"[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee A, 8th July, 1958; cols. 45–46.]
Unfortunately, the hon. Lady apparently has not been able to reach any helpful conclusion on this matter, and I think we all feel very disappointed about it.
Therefore, in this Amendment, anxious as we are to be helpful, we have drawn on the rich mine of experience and information which the hon. Lady has to present in this new subsection a proposal based on her two points; namely, that the children's authority should direct its attention not only to the foster parents, but to other people in the family, and, secondly, that it should look not only into cases of tuberculosis but into any health grounds which would be detrimental to a child. That seems to me to be an absolutely necessary and reasonable proposal, and I hope that the hon. Lady will support it by saying so.
After all, I think she herself mentioned the question of epilepsy, which is a difficult thing sometimes to see immediately, and yet may arise in an older child in a family, which might be subject to severe epileptic attacks, which could cause injury to younger children, or it may even be found in the foster parents themselves. Obviously, I should have thought, the


children's authority should ask about these things. The hon. Lady said that the people concerned might tell lies and that it would be very difficult to establish that they were lying, but I do not think that most foster parents would adopt that attitude. I think they feel that this is an important responsibility, and that they will want to co-operate with the children's authority and be prepared to take advice from it.
It may well be that, as a result of inquiries, it would not mean that the children's authority would decide that they were unsuitable but would give certain advice as a safeguard in these matters, or might arrange for the health visitor to call and give elementary instruction in hygiene, keeping dishes and knives and forks clean, or, possibly, deal with the problem of how to watch epileptic attacks and that sort of thing.
I am sorry to have continued to repeat the word "obviously," but so much of this argument is patent that I cannot understand why the hon. Lady has had any difficulty. I very much hope that she will see her way to meet us on this matter, because our proposals are entirely rooted in what she herself said in Committee.

12 noon.

Mrs. Lena Jeger: I beg to second the Amendment.
It will be noticed that our suggestion is simply that an inquiry should be made of the people concerned. This is the kind of inquiry which is made when one applies for a driving licence. One is asked to state whether one suffers from epilepsy or from other disabilities which are listed. Considering the tremendous importance of the matter we are now discussing, inquiries of that kind are the very minimum reasonable. We are not asking for any outside inquiry to be made. This is simply a matter of the household concerned. We regard this as a very moderate request to which we hope the Government will be able to accede.

Mr. Barnett Janner: I support the Amendment. My profession is more intimately concerned with these things than are many other people. It is essential that every pre-

caution should be taken in the interests of the child concerned to see that the people in whose care the child is placed are suitable, especially in those respects to which the Amendment refers. If that is not done, not only is the child likely to be temporarily affected, but there is a possibility—and I have come across such cases—that the wrong kind of home will result in a child being affected for the rest of his life.
In some cases, it is not entirely the fault of those who were anxious to have the child. Far be it from me to say that in cases where the ultimate result is not as satisfactory as desired it is always the fault of those who were keen to have children in their care. On the contrary, in many cases they are very good-hearted people and anxious to do what they possibly can. If an investigation or inquiry on the lines suggested in the Amendment had been undertaken, it might have been found—and in many cases it would have been found—that the people concerned were not suitable for attending to the needs of the child.
I hope that the hon. Lady will consider the plea which has been made and will do her best to accede to it. This is only a small concession for which we are asking, and I hope, even if the Amendment is not accepted, that the hon. Lady will indicate to local authorities that they should make these inquiries, although I think that this should be the compulsory provision to deal with those cases where local authorities are not prepared to accept this serious obligation.

Miss Hornsby-Smith: As hon. Members know, Clause 1 lays a general duty on local authorities to ensure the well-being of foster children, and obviously any authority responsible for this work will take into consideration matters relating to the health of a person who proposes to maintain a foster child, or of any member of the household in which that child is to live.
It must be remembered that these authorities are not only the authorities responsible for the protection of children, but also the health authorities. Health is not the only consideration which they have to bear in mind. We feel that it would not be wise within the Bill to single out that one subject, with priority over the many other considerations which have to


be taken into account, by making a special reference to health. Indeed, the hon. Lady the Member for Holborn and St. Pancras, South (Mrs. L. Jeger) made a singularly understanding speech—I do not wish to misinterpret her—about the necessity of keeping a sense of balance in judging defects in health which might not debar adults from being good foster parents.
However, I am in great sympathy with what hon. Members intend and I certainly endorse their desire that there should be an investigation. Indeed, I am sure that the very responsible and experienced authorities will undertake such an investigation in any case. I am authorised by my right hon. Friend to say that the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for Scotland will take administrative action to draw the attention of local authorities to the importance of the health of the household which a child is to join, and to the sources of information about it.

Mr. W. Wells: I am very glad that the hon. Lady concluded on that note. While I must agree with her that there are matters other than physical health which it is important for a local authority to take into account, the Amendment is worded in such a way that the authority shall have a duty to inquire only in to a state of health which would be detrimental to the children concerned.
Obviously, it is most important that when a child is placed with foster parents, other things being equal, it should remain where it is placed. There are many psychological factors which, with the best inspection in the world, might not be apparent at first sight; but physical health is something susceptible of objective treatment and it should receive it.
We should have preferred to have seen a provision of this kind written into the Bill, but, for myself, I feel that the undertaking which the hon. Lady is given is a very good second best, and in those circumstances my hon. Friends may not wish to proceed further with the Amendment.

Mr. MacColl: In those circumstances, I have no alternative but to ask the leave of the House to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Mr. MacColl: I beg to move, in page 4, line 8, to leave out subsection (5) and to insert:
(5) Where a foster child is removed for a period not to exceed one month from the care of the person maintaining him, such person need not give a notice under subsection (4) of this section but shall at the request of the local authority give them the same particulars as would have been required to be stated in the notice; should the foster child not have returned at the expiry of one month from the date of his removal the person previously maintaining him shall give a notice under subsection (4) of this section unless particulars have already been given to the local authority under this subsection, and should such person subsequently maintain or propose to maintain the child as a foster child he shall give a notice under subsection (1) of this section.
I was a little hurt that the hon. Lady paid tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Holborn and St. Pancras, South (Mrs. L. Jeger) for being understanding: I had hoped that she would have felt that I, too, was understanding. Certainly I feel that the hon. Lady is doing her best to be helpful with this Bill, which we have very much at heart, and I hope that she will find that this proposal is a very good way of trying to meet some of the difficulties, which we discussed in Committee and which we all recognise, which arise with the temporary absence of children from foster homes.
The existing proposal in the Bill is that if a child leaves its foster home and does not go to another foster home, the obligation to report that it has gone is removed. In Committee the Joint Parliamentary Secretary mentioned the case where
… the child goes off for a week to a scout camp, or into hospital to have its tonsils out, or to spend a week-end or so with an aunt known to have a good family and who has offered to give the child a few days' holiday with her own children …
and said:
It is not reasonable to expect that in that type of circumstance the individual would think it necessary to notify the local authority of the circumstances, and, indeed, in such cases notice would not be necessary for the welfare of the child."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee A, 8th July, 1958; c. 30–31.]
That is the common ground from which we start. But we think that the way in which the Bill tries to overcome the difficulty is not the best way. It places emphasis on the question whether or not there is to be any reward for the people to whom the child is going, but there is no question as to how long the absence


is to be, and the proposal contained in the Amendment would seem to us to be a more sensible way of dealing with the problem.
It says, first, that if the child is removed for a period not exceeding one month the exemptions that we are discussing are to apply, but if the removal is for more than one month they are not to apply. In such a case the full obligation will remain upon the foster parents. That will cover the whole question of short absences to go to hospital to have tonsils removed, or to go to a scouts' camp or to an aunt. In the case of more permanent removal the Measure will continue in full operation. That covers the first point, of notifying the absence.
The second point is the question of notifying the return. The suggested subsection says that if the foster child has not returned at the end of a month notice shall be given under the provisions of subsection (4). Then, if the child does return, notice is given under subsection (1). That is a very neat way of meeting the difficulty. If it is a short absence the exemption under the proposed subsection will apply; if it returns at the end of a longer absence notice is given under subsection (1) and if there is no return notice is given under subsection (4).
I know that this is a complicated and difficult matter to explain, but it is an important one. It all links up with the general problem of keeping track of children. I do not think that we can over-emphasise the importance of that. The Amendment seeks to deal with cases where children seem to slide from home to home and the authorities have very great difficulty in following their movements. It can happen that children are pushed out on one day, when it is thought that the children's inspector may be coming along, and then find their way back again after two or three days. It is difficult to keep track of what is happening.
I am not suggesting that the Amendment would tie up all the ends, but it would provide a foundation upon which children's authorities could follow the movements of the children. This is a point which was generally agreed in principle upstairs and I hope that the hon. Lady will be able to help us now by accepting the Amendment.

Mr. Janner: I beg to second the Amendment.
I ask the Minister once again, in the interests of the child, to say that this is an appropriate way of dealing with the matter which my hon. Friend the Member for Widnes (Mr. MacColl) has so clearly put before her. I agree that in an Amendment of this sort it is difficult not to include references, and the Amendment contains references to various subsections, which are not easily understandable except to those who know the Bill well.
The short point is that if a child is to have the full benefit of adoption, and to have a happy and proper upbringing which will ultimately help to ensure that it has a happy life, and which will not interfere in a psychological or any other sense with its welfare when it grows into adolescence or becomes an adult, some such provision as this is necessary. It is important not only that the foster parents themselves shall be the right kind of people, but that if at any time the child goes out of the actual custody of the foster parents, no matter for how short a time, it should not be brought under adverse influences.
12.15 p.m.
That is all that the Amendment seeks to do. We are trying to put the matter as reasonably as we can, so as to ensure that the welfare of the child shall not be damaged by a temporary absence from the foster parents. Even a short absence may have a very damaging effect upon the future life of a child. In the course of a few weeks a child who has got into the wrong hands may develop tendencies which will last all through its life. We know that on occasions even one simple incident may make a world of difference to the future of a person. We are taking more and more notice of psychological examinations in these days, and we know that when a person is brought before the criminal courts it is sometimes found that an incident which took place in the past has so affected him that he commits a certain crime.
I am sure that the hon. Lady is anxious to do everything she can to avoid, as far as is humanly possible, any interference with the proper welfare of the child, and I hope that in all the circumstances she will accept the Amendment.

Miss Hornsby-Smith: May I seek your guidance, Mr. Speaker? I had hoped that, as they apply to the same Clause and deal with the same topic, we would have been able to discuss with this Amendment the following one, in page 4, line 15 leave out "six" and insert "three".

Mr. Speaker: That would be quite proper.

Miss Hornsby-Smith: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I am very happy to add to the list of understanding Members the hon. Member for Widnes (Mr. MacColl). Hon. Members have been very understanding in trying to arrive at a balance between what we all know to be two different sets of problems. We want to protect the child, but, at the same time, we want to avoid imposing the unnecessary burden of the multiplication of notices for trivial absences, sometimes where a child is obviously going to receive the best possible care—as in cases where it goes to hospital. We also want to avoid so framing the provisions of the Bill that people unwittingly commit quite grave offences, as they would do if we made the limitation too sharp. They would be committing offences which could bring upon them a penalty of six months' imprisonment or a f100 fine, when anyone would realise that in the view of the foster parent the child was remaining in good and adequate care.
It is a question of balance as to whether six months is too long or one month is too short a period. Hon. Members opposite will see that there is an Amendment down in the name of my right hon. Friend. We feel that there is some substance in the view that the period of six months is too long. On the other hand, we feel that a month is particularly short. For instance, every time a child went back to its boarding school at the beginning of the term, notice would have to be sent to the local authority, or a stay in hospital, or a holiday might well run over the month.
We accept that six months is probably too long, and feel that a compromise of three months would more adequately provide for the protection of the child and would, at the same time, prevent people being put in peril of committing an offence in circumstances in which the ordinary person would be quite unlikely to realise that any offence had been com-

mitted at all. It would relieve those looking after foster children of the duty of giving unnecessary notices; and the local authority of receiving them.
I think that the time is the only point at issue here. We have given the matter very great consideration, and feel that the qualifying period of one month is too short, but that three months would operate in the best interests of both sides. Further, it does not appear to us that a qualifying period of three months involves any risk of danger to the wellbeing of the child which would be avoided by reducing the period to one month because, while the child is away, it is not, and cannot be, subject to supervision, as the subsection ceases to apply if the child ceases to be a foster child.
It is this which justifies the Government's view that these provisions deal only with machinery, and dispense with unnecessary notices about which the local authority could take no action under the Bill even if it did not receive them because, as I say, this applies to children who cease, for that period, to be foster children. I therefore hope that hon. Members will agree that we have, in part at least, met them.

Mr. W. Wells: I agree that this is a question of machinery, and also of degree. The hon. Lady says that one month is too short, and we say, in effect, that three months is too long. A month is quite a long time in the life of a child. Much may happen, and there is always the danger of the child being lost sight of during that period. It is not a very great danger, but it could happen. I agree that it is a very difficult balance to strike.
We are grateful to the hon. Lady for the Amendment that has been put down, in page 4, line 15, in the name of the Home Secretary, and which, no doubt, will be moved after this present Amendment has been disposed of, While it is certainly a real improvement, one must draw attention to the fact that it does not deal at all with the problem outlined in the first limb of this subsection—the question of the child going away. It deals only with the question of the child coming back.
I think that the hon. Lady is being a bit too sensitive about the fear of documentation at the beginning of school


terms. If she had my experience of being the father of children at boarding school, she would know that the beginning of terms is made hideous for the child by the imminence of returning studies; and for the father, certainly by the necessity of paying the school fees but also by the formidable documentation that modern schools require, as to whom the children have been seeing during the holidays, whether or not they have had chicken pox and the like.
One brought up as a lawyer is a bit diffident about perjuring oneself—if one is not, then, of course, one does not mind—so one plods away. However, in a rather serious matter like this, too much attention should not be paid to the fact that a certain number of people have to fill up a certain number of forms. Filling up forms is one of the joys of modern life, and I do not see why foster parents should be denied it.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Widnes (Mr. MacColl) for his kindly references to the drafting of this Amendment. For my part, I should like to say that I am very grateful to him for explaining it so much better than I could myself. It is a difficult matter on which to come to a conclusion. Nevertheless, I feel that the Government have gone some way towards meeting us. We want to make progress with this Bill, and in the circumstances, I hope that, perhaps—and certainly without any directive on my part—my hon. Friend may feel disposed to withdraw this Amendment in order that we can get the modest and limited improvement that the hon. Lady has promised.

Mr. MacColl: I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment made: In page 4, line 15, leave out "six" and insert "three".[Miss Hornsby-Smith.]

Clause 4.—(POWER TO INSPECT PREMISES, IMPOSE CONDITIONS, OR PROHIBIT THE KEEPING OF FOSTER CHILDREN.)

Miss Joan Vickers: I beg to move, in page 4, line 35, to leave out from "keep" to "the" in line 37, and to insert:
a foster child in any premises and the local authority are of opinion that it would be

detrimental to that child to be kept by him in those premises".

Mr. Speaker: I understand that the Amendment in page 5, line 10, after "person", insert "is keeping or" is consequential upon this one, so they may be discussed together.

Miss Vickers: Yes, Mr. Speaker.
There was a great measure of agreement in Committee that this Clause needed some change. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Smethwick (Mr. Gordon Walker) then said:
I should like briefly to support what the hon. Member for Devonport … has said. Apart from the powerful arguments that she has advanced, this seems to me to be a limiting Clause, the ultimate effects of which one might not be able to foresee, and one might thereby create unintended loopholes."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee A, 8th July, 1958; c. 40.]
I spoke on this subject on Second Reading, but in Committee I withdrew the Amendment as I felt that my wording was not the most satisfactory, though I hoped that it would be looked at. The present provision is unsatisfactory and is a poor substitute for the present Section 211 (1) of the 1950 Act, which specifically lays down that the welfare authority may fix the maximum number of children under 18 years of age who may be kept in any premises in which a foster child is kept; and may also impose conditions limiting the number of children.
Here the limit is on the number of children accommodated mainly for fostering. I realise that that brings in private homes—and there is good reason for that—but it still does not apply to what are often called the "back street baby farmers" who in many ways are a very much greater menace. There is strong ground for saying that local authorities should have powers to limit the number of children. The Public Health Act, 1936, covers all children privately fostered, but I understand that this Clause, as now worded, would not operate in the same way.
Local authorities could not limit the number of children, who could, therefore, include the foster parents' own children, children of relatives of the foster parents, daily-minded children, and children who could be put there by the local authority under the child protection provisions.


There is now nothing in the Clause to stop all those children coming into the premises.
I realise that under the Nurseries and Child-Minders Regulation Act, 1948, the local authority can limit that type of children, but not the others that I have mentioned. The Nurseries and Child-Minders Regulation Act deals with only one or more children in protection cases. Therefore, I want to require local authorities to be able to limit the number of foster-children only. Section 201 of the 1950 Act can impose a limit on the total number of children. The foster-parents may have a total number of foster-children limited to them, but, as the Act stands at present, they can have any number of other children. That is what I want to safeguard in this Clause.

Mr. Graham Page: I beg to second the Amendment.

12.30 p.m.

Miss Hornsby-Smith: With respect to my hon. Friend the Member for Devonport (Miss Vickers), I still think the Amendment goes far wider than hon. Members would wish. Nor do I think they would wish to impose these very close investigations on ordinary family foster-care. Indeed, if a child were received for a holiday for a month all these conditions would have to be imposed. They are not applicable to private placings in the same way as they are to permanent institutional placings where homes for foster-children are involved.
The basis of this subsection is to deal, and properly so, with thorough investigation, checking and inspection of commercial institutions where foster-children may be kept. It gives the local authority power to make requirements, quite rightly, about the staffing of institutions, accommodation, equipment, medical arrangements and the keeping of records. This Amendment would extend the application of all those investigations and requirements to every household in which a foster child is kept. The conditions specified, apart from those in paragraph (a) and (b) relating to the number, age and sex of the foster-children and the accommodation and equipment provided, would not be appropriate in the case of private arrangements.
The Amendment would restrict the exercise of local authorities' power to those cases in which a child was being kept or was going to be kept by a person or in premises detrimental to the child. In such a case, as I pointed out in Committee, local authorities have powers under Clause 4 (3), under which in certain circumstances any child is prohibited from being received, and under Clause 7 there is power to apply for the removal of any child.
I cannot see the point of my hon. Friend's comment that there is no limit to the number of children who may be received. The very powers which the local authorities have in Clauses 4 (3) and 7 will give them full opportunity to decide whether too many children are being taken into foster-care, whether there is already a large family and whether there are not adequate provisions for a foster-child to be added to it. I am sure that we are not divided in our intention that protection should properly be given, and I assure my hon. Friend that those two Clauses give local authorities the power which they need for private placings.
I sincerely feel that this Amendment goes much wider than it ought and would be a gross interference with ordinary family foster-child placings. For that reason, I am afraid that I am unable to accept the Amendment.

Mr. W. Wells: I accept the logic of the hon. Lady's answer to the hon. Member for Devonport (Miss Vickers), but I think on reflection that some little difficulty may arise simply from the way in which this Clause is worded. I refer to the use of the words:
Where a person is keeping or pro-poses to keep foster-children in premises used … wholly or mainly for that purpose …
I can foresee some difficulties of interpretation arising, and I hope that I carry the Solicitor-General for Scotland with me, from the use of the words or mainly." A lot of argument might arise about that, and I should have thought, if it is too late in this Bill, at any rate when we come to deal with the consolidation Measure that some thought should be given to the question of the retention of those words.

Amendment negatived.

Clause 18.—(CONSENTS TO ADOPTION.)

Miss Vickers: I beg to move, in page 10, line 20 to leave out subsection (2).
This provision deals with the adoption rights of local authorities. I want to ensure that an adoption made in respect of a child for whom a local authority has parental rights is safeguarded. I should like to read what has been sent to me by the children's officers about this provision, because they are the people who will have to operate this Bill. They said:
This Clause removes all rights which the local authority now possesses to object to an adoption order being made in respect of a child in care for whom the local authority holds parental rights.
They think it is not clear that where foster-parents apply for an adoption order without the support of the local authority the local authority would be in a position to appear in court as respondent, at least not when the foster-home was in the area of another local authority.
If this Clause were enacted, it would mean that foster-parents could get in touch with a real mother and, between them, they could arrange an adoption and the local authority would be powerless to prevent this. This could lead to a type of blackmail, which has been practised by one or two foster-parents who have gone behind the back of the local authority and have got the mother's consent to an adoption of which the local authority does not approve. I understand from the various people with whom I have discussed the matter that this has already happened. Therefore, the children's officers would like this position safeguarded. I think they would be even more unhappy about this procedure in a case where there were no natural parents available.
I realise that, as the Clause stands, it is based on the assumption that a local authority which placed and retained a child in a foster-home would be satisfied to see the child adopted by the foster-parents concerned, but I do not think this is necessarily so. A child is often put in a foster-home, perhaps during the illness of the mother or for some short period; it might even go on for six months. Then if the mother went before the court it might be said that cruelty

could not be proved and that the adoption was defective. If the local authority were not allowed to be a respondent unfortunate consequences might arise.
At least in the early stages of any fostering, most children's officers would regard the relationship as tentative, and even subsequently it is doubtful whether fostering could go on successfully. I hope my hon. Friend will look into this matter. It may make considerable difficulties for the children's officers concerned in considering the fostering of children in the future, because it might tie their hands if the case went to the court later.

Mr. Page: I beg to second the Amendment.
I do not think it has been explained in an earlier stage of the proceedings exactly why it has been decided to exclude the local authorities from necessary consent in these cases. It seems to me that the whole trend of our discussion on this Bill has been to bring into adoption cases all those who have the concern of the welfare of the child. In these cases where a local authority is exercising parental rights under a fit persons order, or where it is exercising parental rights by a resolution under Section 2 of the principal Act, its consent ought to be obtained before an adoption order is made. Frankly I cannot understand the real purpose of this subsection.

Miss Hornsby-Smith: I hope that I shall be able to reassure my hon. Friend the Member for Devonport (Miss Vickers) that many of the fears that she has expressed are quite unfounded. Clause 18 (2) gives effect to a recommendation in paragraph 110 of the Hurst Committee. It is merely declaratory. That is to say, the purpose of this provision is to remove any doubt which there may be about the effect of the provision in the principal Act to which it refers. If we were merely to leave out this subsection as the hon. Lady's Amendment suggests, it would not reverse the meaning of the principal Act in any way. It would merely leave the matter still in doubt, and I am sure she would agree that there would be no advantage in that.
May I also reassure my hon. Friend and those who have made representations to her on another point. The object


which I believe the Amendment seeks to achieve, is no doubt, to require the consent of a local authority which has parental rights and powers under a court order or a resolution. I was very surprised that my hon. Friend the Member for Crosby (Mr. Page) seconded this Amendment. No one has fought more vigorously than he has for parents' rights during the passage of this Bill. Yet here he is suggesting that a local authority under, perhaps, quite a short term order is to have overriding powers over a parents' rights.

Mr. Page: No, I was asking for consent from local authorities, and not in abrogation of parents' rights in any way. I want the parents' consent to be given, too.

Miss Hornsby-Smith: It would be quite wrong to give a power which might be exercised in contravention of the wishes of the parent, even though the local authority were temporarily vested with parental rights over the child. I think I can meet the points and criticisms which have been made. First, I think it should be remembered that the Hurst Committee was against local authorities having this power, though the local authority has every opportunity to state its views because under the Bill as it stands the local authority for the area in which an applicant is living will be a respondent, and so will the local authority having parental rights and powers if it is in a different area. I think that meets the main objection raised by my hon. Friend.
We could not accept that a local authority with, perhaps, short-term powers of protection as the foster-parent of the child should be in a position to override the wishes of the natural parent, but they have the right and duty as respondent, whether within their area or whether they are for the time being assuming parental rights over the child who may be resident in another area. I assure my hon. Friend that that point is covered and I hope that she will not press the Amendment.

Amendment negatived.

12.45 p.m.

Miss Hornsby-Smith: I beg to move, in page 10, line 43, to leave out from "infant" to "the" in line 1 of page 11.

Mr. Speaker: Hon. Members will observe that if this Amendment is carried,

the next Amendment in the name of the hon. Member for Smethwick (Mr. Gordon Walker), in line 43, leave out from "then" to "the" in line 1 on page 11 and insert:
if it appears to the court to be for the welfare of the infant".
and also that in the name of the hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Page) in page 11, line 1, after "will" insert:
within a reasonable time commence and thereafter continue to
will fall. Therefore, on this Government Amendment the hon. Members must make any point that they wish to make in connection with their Amendments.

Miss Hornsby-Smith: During the Standing Committee debates the Government promised to consider again whether the provisions of this subsection could be improved. We have examined with great care the arguments put forward bath by hon. Members in this House and in another place. It is clear, I think, that there is general agreement that, so far as possible, we wish to close the gap in the law to which attention was drawn so specifically by the Hurst Committee. We want, so far as we are able, to provide a form of words which will enable the court to be put in possession of all the relevant facts and then reach a conclusion which will not do violence to the natural rights of parents which are not extinguished by failings or shortcomings, and, at the same time, not do damage to the child's prospect of a happy and contented life.
Fortunately, the number of occasions on which the courts will have to exercise discretion in this way will be limited, but they are important for a particular class of child whose parents, while not criminally abandoning it or criminally neglecting it, have, to all intents and purposes, abandoned it and taken no notice or care of the child or any interest in its upbringing or welfare. In many cases, it will be perfectly clear to the judges, after having the evidence, what the right course in specific instances is. We have had the evidence and opinion of the Hurst Committee that the courts feel themselves bound by the narrower and tighter definition which applies under the existing law.
It is the task of Parliament to ensure that the form of words enacted does not unwittingly debar the courts from taking a course which, on all the evidence, they


believe to be right and proper. We considered the problem again very fully and in the light of the probable circumstances in which it would fall to the courts to exercise this discretion. We do not withdraw from the substance of the views which have hitherto been voiced in the House and in another place, but we recognise that the existing form of words has caused anxiety about its application or interpretation.
We do not claim even that the Amendment is perfect. This Clause gave rise to varying suggestions in Committee here and in another place, and we feel that this is the best compromise solution, to put it in that way, which can be reached. We are satisfied that it goes as far as we can without upsetting the balance between the rights of natural parents who have not abjectly failed to accept their responsibilities and duties and the need to provide for the care, welfare and future happiness of the child.
The matter has been discussed and debated for a long time. I know that there are many variations of view, with the same principle in mind. I hope that hon. Members will feel that, in putting down this Amendment, we have done our best to meet the conflicting views and bring about a balance which will leave it to the judge to make his decision on the evidence he has but which will give him the additional power to deal with that small class of case in regard to which, we understand from various judgments in the past, the courts have felt themselves inhibited.

Mr. Kenneth Younger: My right hon. and hon. Friends are very grateful to the hon. Lady the Joint Under-Secretary of State for the great trouble she has obviously taken over this matter and for the considerable step she has made in coming towards the views which were expressed both in our proceedings in Committee and in another place. In Committee, I myself referred to the possibility that one might find a solution by taking out the words which the hon. Lady is now proposing to take out without replacing them by the words, to which we were always rather attached, relating to the welfare of the child. In adopting the course she has, she has come a considerable way towards meeting our wishes.
The issue has always been posed in the form of it being an attempt to keep a

balance between the conflicting interests of parent and child. Speaking for myself, one of the things which made me rather obstinate about it, was that, in another place, the Lord Chancellor, whether intentionally or not, seemed to pose the issue in a way which made the antagonism between these interests rather sharper than, perhaps, it is. I do not believe that, in substance, there is as much between those who support the two sides of the argument as sometimes appears.
If I may repeat it, the thing which has worried us is that, although it is provided by, I think, Section 5 of the principal Act that the court must take account of the welfare of the infant before making an adoption order, nevertheless, with the law as it stands, it seemed that there was a possibility that an application for adoption might already have failed before the judge addressed himself to this question of the welfare of the child, because there was no reference to this matter in the Section dealing with dispensing or not dispensing with consent. Because we felt that the phrase which the hon. Lady is now proposing to delete had a tendency to direct the mind of the court rather positively away from the welfare of the child, we were worried about that. Now that it is to come out, I think that we can accept this as a very reasonable solution. After all, this is one of the many matters within the subject-matter of the Bill in regard to which one must leave a great deal to the discretion of the courts. One must assume that the courts will be reasonable about these things. Therefore, my hon. Friends and I are prepared to accept gratefully the hon. Lady's proposal, and we do not propose to move our Amendment.

Mr. Page: Clause 18, subsection (3) is bad, and it will be made a hundred times worse by leaving out the words which my hon. Friend the Joint Under-Secretary of State now wishes to leave out. These words have been supported throughout our consideration of the Bill until this very late stage. They form part of the whole structure of the subsection. As the House knows, the subsection adds the case in which the court can dispense with the consent of the parent.
As it stands, the court may dispense with the consent of the parent if three things are shown: first, that the parent


has failed to carry out the obligations of a parent, second, if he has done so without reasonable cause, and third, as the Clause now stands, if it is unlikely that he will fulfil his obligations in the future. This third condition is to be deleted if the Amendment is accepted. The court, in considering whether it will dispense with the parent's consent, will consider only the past, and not consider what the parent may hope and honestly believe he can do in the future.
My opposition to this provision has been root and branch throughout. Therefore, I will endeavour to contain my remarks on the Amendment to the Amendment alone and hope that, perhaps, I shall catch your eye, Mr. Speaker, at a later stage to put once again the arguments against the whole Clause. My arguments against the Amendment are that, without these words in the subsection, all we are doing is to penalise the parent for past conduct. All the court is required to look at, if the Amendment is accepted is the question, "Has the parent carried out the obligations of a parent in the past?"
We must remember that the Clause will apply not only to adoption orders in the proper sense of the term, but also to provisional adoption orders for adoption abroad and to cases concerned with secrecy in adoption, that is to say, when the parent does not know who the adopters are. It will apply also to an infant parent. It will dispense with consent in those cases, and, it seems to me, it will disregard entirely the rights of the parent and put in their place an obligation on the court to say whether a parent has, in the past, been a good parent or a bad parent.
I am sure that the general public looks upon the adoption law as the instrument through which the State considers whether it is right that, in any particular case, a child's family should be changed between consenting parties. I do not think that people normally look upon adoption as a means of forcing a parent to give up a child. It is true that, under the existing law, there are cases in which a parent can be forced to give up a child, but they are cases in which a parent has done harm to a child because of abandonment, neglect and persistent ill-treatment—all cases in which the child has obviously suffered some injury.
Under the Clause, if amended, we are not considering at all whether the child has been harmed by what the parent has done. We are asking the court to decide that the parent shall be deprived of the child merely because of failure to observe the obligations of a parent.

Mrs. L. Jeger: Surely, there is some misunderstanding here. As I read it, the Clause says that the court may, in certain circumstances, dispense with the consent of the parent, not that the court shall dispense with it.

Mr. Page: I am obliged to the hon. Lady, but, of course, she will realise that, as a result of going to the court, that discretion removes the right of the parent to prevent the court making such an order. It is true that it does not oblige the court to make an order even though the court may find that the obligations of the parent have not been fulfilled; but it prevents a parent from objecting to an adoption order being made.
I trust that the House will realise the finality and irrevocability of an adoption order. It implies a complete change in the status of the child, a breach of the family rights, and so on, which can never be set aside in the future.
Many of these cases in which there is difficulty about the consent of the parent come before the court when an unmarried mother is involved. An unmarried mother may have her child with her for, perhaps, six weeks, and then a placing order is arranged through an adoption society. Under the Clause, if amended, after some further weeks or months or, even, perhaps, a year, the prospective adopter with whom the child has been placed can go to the court and say, "This mother has not carried out the obligations of a parent for some months." Even if the mother comes before the court and says, "I have not carried out the obligations of a parent; I have left the child in this perfectly good home where it has been very well looked after, because I was ashamed of what had happened, but now I am prepared to carry out my parental duties," that would be no answer if the Amendment is carried.
1.0 p.m.
If we accept the Amendment, I am sure that we are not realising the emotional difficulties in cases where the parent is perhaps obstinate over consent.


It is not only the mother who has parental rights; the father has parental rights too. We shall be depriving them of those rights and looking solely to the welfare of the child.
Of course, it is right that we should look to the welfare of the child; but is not there some danger in looking only to the material welfare of the child? It may be that in many instances a child will have a better standard of life in the home of the adopter. But are we for that reason to ask the court to say that because the real parent has failed in the past that parent is not to have another opportunity in the future, and that the court is not obliged to consider whether that parent will look after the child in future, but can dispense with consent without any regard to the parental rights of the parent? I, for one, hope that the Amendment will be rejected.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 19.—(OTHER CONDITIONS OF ADOPTION.)

Amendment proposed: In page 12, line 12, at end insert:
as evidenced, in such cases as may be prescribed, by the certificate of a fully registered medical practitioner".—[Miss Hornsby-Smith.]

Mr. W. Wells: We are glad that the hon. Lady has seen fit to introduce the Amendment, but as those who have studied the Notice Paper will see, we have chosen to go very much further. We propose to make it obligatory on a court before making an adoption order to satisfy itself, either by oral evidence or by a certificate from a registered medical practitioner, that there were no medical objections to the order being made.
This matter was fully discussed in Committee. We welcome the Amendment, but we do not think that it goes far enough. It is, however, a step in the right direction. I feel sure that later it will be found necessary to go further in this direction, but for the moment we are disposed to accept the Amendment.

Miss Hornsby-Smith: I should like to give the hon. and learned Gentleman at least some assurance on this point. I

know the Amendment does not go so far as certain hon. Members wish, but we have tried to meet the views which were strongly expressed in Committee about medical certificates, and I can assure the hon. and learned Gentleman that my noble Friend the Lord Chancellor intends to make rules that will result in a medical certificate being required in the generality of cases in England and Wales, although he intends to except certain kinds of cases—for example, those in which the adopter, or one of them in a joint application, is the mother of the child. In administrative practice, this Amendment will go a long way to meet the point.

Mr. Wells: I very much welcome what the hon. Lady has said. If I am not straying too far outside the rules of order, may I ask her whether the Lord Chancellor also proposes to make rules in relation to the costs? The hon. Lady will remember that the Hurst Committee made a recommendation that there should be compulsory medical examination and that the costs of such examination should be met out of public funds.

Miss Hornsby-Smith: We do not propose to go as far as that. We feel that this matter is one of several questions of costs which automatically apply in general adoption proceedings.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 21.—(PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE.)

Mr. W. Wells: I beg to move, in page 12, line 38, at the end to insert:
Where, on an application made in England to a county court, the court makes or refuses to make an adoption order, an appeal shall lie to the Court of Appeal on any question of law or fact.
The hon. Lady will recall that we discussed in Committee the precise position relating to appeals when we discussed the Amendment the result of which is that where the adoption proceedings are taken in a magistrates' court appeal will lie to the High Court on either fact or law instead of, as otherwise would have been the position, the appeal on fact or indeed on law going to quarter sessions, unless a case was stated for the divisional court.
The position under the Clause as it stands is somewhat anomalous. It is possible in the High Court to appeal under the Judicature Act to the Court


of Appeal on any question of law or fact. Under the Measure, as amended, it will now be possible to appeal from the magistrates' court to the High Court on law or fact. But when proceedings are taken in the county court the matter is governed, as I understand, by the County Courts Act, 1934, which provides for an appeal on law but not for an appeal on fact. The 1955 Act makes no difference in this regard.
As I outlined the matter in Committee, the reason for the difference made in the rules relating to appeals in the High Court and in the county court is normally based on the difference in value of the subject matter which is at stake. If the county court is regarded more or less but not wholly as a poor man's court, it is undesirable that there should be a multiplicity of appeals on matters of limited financial value.
When we deal with adoption orders, however, we clearly move into an entirely different territory. There is no difference at all between the value of a child in respect of whom adoption proceedings are taken in the High Court and the value of a child in respect of whom proceedings are taken in the county court. In our view, the rules relating to appeals should be precisely the same, irrespective of the tribunal before whom the proceedings are taken.
That is the purpose of the Amendment. I believe that the case for amendment on these lines is self-evident. If there is anything wrong, as there may very well be, with the drafting of the Amendment, I hope that even at this late stage the hon. Lady will take steps to have it put right when the Bill goes to the other place for our Amendments to be considered. I hope, however, that she will be able to meet us in principle on this point.

Mr. Younger: I beg to second the Amendment.

Miss Hornsby-Smith: I find myself at a disadvantage in answering a thoroughly legalistic question from the hon. and learned Member for Walsall, North (Mr. W. Wells) with his long experience in that field. As I understand it, the Amendment seeks to widen the present right of appeal to include an appeal on merit. It is felt that in practice this is unnecessary, for the following reasons. In an

adoption case, the judge's decision always amounts to the exercise of judicial discretion and the Court of Appeal is always ready to interfere if it is satisfied that a judge has wrongly exercised his discretion. The Court of Appeal is in a position to interfere where circumstances warrant it because in practice the appeal, though it is confined to points of law, is wider than an appeal by case stated.
It may be, however, that the hon. and learned Member and his colleagues have in mind an appeal with a full rehearing of the case. I quite agree that this was what the Hurst Committee had in mind in its recommendation. Such an appeal could not, however, be heard by the Court of Appeal, which does not in practice hear oral evidence. A complete rehearing in an appeal from the county court could only be achieved by another tier in the appellate structure.
My noble Friend the Lord Chancellor does not consider this justifiable, since the existing right of appeal on a point of law has shown itself to be adequate. For example, the hon. and learned Member will remember that there was a recent case in which the refusal by the county court to dispense with the consent of the father of an illegitimate child was overruled by the Court of Appeal. I assure the hon. and learned Member that my right hon. Friend and his noble Friend have gone into this question deeply. I hope, therefore, that the hon. and learned Member will feel able not to press his Amendment.

Mr. MacColl: I am not sure that understand the position. The hon. Lady is trying to convince my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Walsall, North (Mr. W. Wells) that there is no difference between law and fact. That is a matter in which I will not intervene. As I understand the position, there is an appeal from the magistrates' court on law and fact and, therefore, presumably there can be a rehearing of the case. This difference seems to me to be quite wrong.
A juvenile court has, on the whole, probably more experience than any other court in matters concerning children, their welfare, the problems of family life, and so on. That is the day to day work of juvenile courts. In their case, however, there is an appeal and an opportunity for complete rehearing. Magistrates are, on the whole, laymen and,


therefore, their interpretation of the law might often go wildly astray. It is therefore reasonable that there should be an appeal against law also in the case of magistrates, and I do not quarrel about that.
A county court judge is a professional lawyer. An appeal is provided against his decision on matters in which he is professionally qualified at a high level. An appeal is not provided against him on matters of fact dealing with children, family life, and so on—in which his experience is likely to be much less than that of a juvenile court. That seems to me to be completely cockeyed.
1.15 p.m.
I consider that there is a case for appeal in all these matters, very much for the reasons mentioned by the hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Page), who emphasised how grave these questions are. It is most important that there should be an opportunity for a full review by a higher court. I see no reason whatever for exempting appeals from a county court judge on questions of fact. It is on the facts that he is less likely to be qualified to make a sure judgment, although he is highly qualified to deal with law. The matter is, therefore, treated the wrong way round. I can understand the suggestion that as he is a highly experienced lawyer, the legal questions should not have to be argued again, but he might easily slip up on his interpretation of the facts in these difficult problems.

Mr. W. Wells: I sympathise with the Joint Under-Secretary in dealing with this difficult and technical subject. If the hon. Lady has been trying to persuade me that there is no difference between law and fact, I would merely remind her of a dictum of the late Mr. Justice Branson that when the facts are known the law is usually clear. That is an argument on the hon. Lady's side.
I accept that in these cases, whether the appeal be from the High Court or from the county court, the main question at issue will be whether the judge has exercised his discretion on the right principles. That, I suppose, must be mainly a question of law. I should have considered it more satisfactory, for some of the reasons stated by my hon. Friend the

Member for Widnes (Mr. MacColl), to have no differentiation between the High Court and the county court. I accept, however, that the distinction is of less practical importance than it might appear. Although I regret that the hon. Lady cannot accept it, nevertheless I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 24.—(PROVISIONAL ADOPTION BY PERSONS DOMICILED OUTSIDE GREAT BRITAIN.)

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Charles MacAndrew): I suggest that all the Amendments to Clause 24, except those in page 14, lines 39 and 40, in the name of the hon. Member for Widnes (Mr. MacColl), might be taken together. The other two may be taken separately. If Divisions are wanted, Mr. Speaker will be quite happy for Divisions to take place.

Mr. Page: Do you include in those, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, the Amendment in page 14, line 40, at end insert:
(3) A provisional order shall not be made unless every consent thereto without which the principal Act as amended by this Act prohibits the making of an adoption order shall contain a specific consent to the removal of the infant from Great Britain naming the country to which consent is given for such removal.
in the name of myself and of the hon. Member for Brixton (Mr. Lipton)?

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Yes, and also the two which follow it, in page 15, line 23.

Mr. Page: I am obliged.
I beg to move, in page 14, line 30, to leave out "or" and to insert:
adoption which is substantially similar to that applicable in Great Britain and which is effective".
I will address my remarks mainly to this Amendment and to the following one, in page 14, line 33, after "interval", insert:
and that an adoption society or other adoption authority active within the said country has knowledge of the application".
These Amendments concern two fairly simple points. Under the Clause, there are provisions for a provisional adoption order when a child is to be adopted outside Great Britain. It seemed to my hon. Friends and myself that the Clause does


not go far enough in protecting the child and in allowing the courts in this country to consider the matter fully before making the provisional adoption order. In particular, no obligation is inserted in the Bill for the court to consider whether there are any effective adoption laws in the country to which the child is to be sent. That is to say, although the court here may make a provisional adoption order, it is not called upon to consider whether any final adoption order may be made in the country to which the child is going and whether anything similar to our law will apply to that child and to the parent who has adapted it.
About half a dozen countries have no adoption laws at all. Others have adoption laws which are very dissimilar to ours. I feel that the court should, before granting a provisional order, give careful consideration to the legal rights which will arise in the country to which the child is to be sent. That is on the first Amendment.
In the second Amendment there is a point of considerable substance. If a provisional order is made and a child eventually goes overseas many things may happen to the adoptive parents, and for all we know in this country a child may be left stranded.
There are some very effective adoption societies operating in many countries. There is one very effective international adoption society. If the court when making the provisional order were satisfied that such a society at least knew that the application was being made, then I think that perhaps the court would feel happier in making the order. As Clause 24 stands, once the provisional order is made the court in this country, and, indeed, I suppose, any administrative powers in this country, wash their hands of the case. I know of no official contacts with children who may be sent abroad in this way. I suppose there may be some contacts through British consular offices or something of that sort, but that is not written into the Bill as yet. If when the application is made to the court here the applicant were obliged to satisfy the court that some adoption authority or some adoption society which is active in the country to which the child is to be sent has knowledge of the application, I think that that would be more satisfactory.
If such a society has knowledge of the application I think we can trust it, because, after all, this is its job, to look after adoptions, to follow up cases. I think we could trust it to follow up such a case and to look after the child should any disaster occur to the adoptive parents or should the adoptive parents abandon the child.

Mr. W. Wells: What would the hon. Gentleman propose in relation to countries where there are no adoption societies or adoption authorities? Would he necessarily preclude all adoptions to such countries in all circumstances?

Mr. Page: I think at this stage we ought. I would prefer at this stage under my Amendment to exclude any countries which have no adoption laws substantially similar to ours, and I would exclude any countries where there are no adoption societies or adoption authorities to which we could confidently look to follow up cases of this sort, and to see that the adoption does take place and that the child is not abandoned. I think we ought to exclude them at this stage. I am sure that in due course, through the good offices of international adoption societies, a chain will be forged between all countries eventually. I feel we ought to allow no child to be abandoned, as it were, to a country which has no satisfactory adoption laws and in which there is no adoption authority we can trust to follow up cases.

Mr. Michael Clark Hutchison: I beg to second the Amendment.
I do not want to make a long speech. I wish merely to express my opposition to Clause 24 as at present drafted. I know there are certain categories of children who, if adopted by foreigners, might benefit—coloured children, for example—but the Clause as at present drafted is much too wide and I am against it for the following reasons.
There are more people in this country waiting to adopt children than there are children available. Why should we bring foreigners in and have them added to the list? This is particularly so in Scotland.
Under Clause 24 there are no proper safeguards, in my view, for the protection of the child. It is left to the discretion of the court, but there are no clearly defined lines which the court ought to


follow, and courts in cases of this sort do vary very much.
Much will depend on the guardian ad litem. As I understand it, the duties are to be laid down in rules of court, but we have not seen those rules, and personally I should like to see these duties more clearly defined.
In my view all adoptions by foreign people should be channelled through an adoption society or local authority. I think that is the best way. We are told that under the main Act and under this Bill local authorities will be brought in and will be respondents. It may be so in England, but it is not so in Scotland. The local authorities there will not automatically be respondents. It may be the intention to make them so, but in this serious matter I prefer to see deeds rather than intentions.
Once the child gets abroad, whatever the theories may be, in practice it will be extremely difficult to help it if anything goes wrong. By "abroad" I mean a foreign country. I am not satisfied that we should let children who are born here under our flag leave without extremely strict safeguards.
The various Amendments down to Clause 24 are designed to strengthen the Bill and the safeguards. I suggest to my hon. Friend that if she cannot accept these Amendments it would be wise for Clause 24 to be struck out altogether, and then perhaps another Bill can be brought in next Session when we have all had more time to study this matter and think about it. We have been much too quick. If my hon. Friend cannot give that undertaking for the United Kingdom as a whole, can she give it for Scotland, so that this Clause will not apply to Scotland and we can have another Bill next Session when the matter has been better tidied up?
I was the only Scottish Member who spoke in Committee on the Bill. I have had a lot of letters against Clause 24. I have not had one in favour of it as at present drawn. Certainly among many influential people in Edinburgh today there is much opposition to it, and I agree with them. I hope, therefore, that my hon. Friend will see her way to improving the Clause.

Mr. Marcus Lipton: I have put my name in support of this Amend-

ment for a number of reasons. Of course, there is no political party principle involved in this issue, and so the fact that I have added my name, for what it is worth, may help to convince the Joint Under-Secretary of State that there is over Clause 24 a strong feeling on both sides of the House.
I will not disguise the fact that I am still as hostile to Clause 24 on Report as I was on Second Reading. I endorse what was said by the hon. Member for Edinburgh, South (Mr. M. Clark Hutchison). From my own point of view this Bill would be very much better if Clause 24 were struck out altogether.
1.30 p.m.
If reference is made to the Report of the Departmental Committee on the Adoption of Children it will be seen that the Committee recommended the continuance of the licensing system. The Committee did not make any strong recommendation on the basis of which the Government are justified in asking the House to accept Clause 24 as it stands. Although I have said, and I still say, that the Bill would be very much better without the Clause, it is a solemn obligation upon all of us to see that, if the Government insist upon forcing the Clause through, every possible safeguard should be introduced to ensure the widest possible protection for the children who will be exported—and I use that word advisedly—as a result of our accepting the Clause.
Nothing was said in Committee that removed or diminished my anxieties. It was admitted that, to all intents and purposes, when we talk about a provisional adoption order it means, in effect, a final adoption order. It means that we have no control whatever over anything that may happen to that child once it leaves the jurisdiction.
The Solicitor-General for Scotland, who, for some reason, was in charge of the legal side of the Bill in Committee, went so far as to say when he was talking about the difficulties of a provisional adoption order that:
I agree there is a difficulty in a case where a provisional order is made and, for some reason, no adoption proceedings are taken in the foreign country, but, from a practical and legal point of view, I see no method of safeguarding against that possibility.


I consider that to be a really shocking admission on the part of a Law Officer recommending the Committee on that occasion to accept the Clause, and now we are asked to accept the Clause without the additional safeguards which we ought to introduce and which we are under a moral obligation to introduce.
I hope, therefore, that the Joint Under-Secretary, on behalf of the Government, will be able to accept the Amendment. I refuse to accept the doctrine, which was advocated by the Solicitor-General for Scotland in Committee, that if there is a risk of this kind,
That is a risk we must face, but I do not think it a greater risk than applies at present under the Section 40 procedure."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee A. 15th July, 1958; c. 110–1.]
I want to emphasise as strongly and sincerely as I possibly can that we ought not to wash our hands of our responsibilities in this matter.
If the Government are determined that children should be allowed to go abroad and be placed in the custody of people in foreign countries, we are at least entitled to an assurance that the countries to which those children shall be allowed to go shall be countries where there is something in the nature of similarity in the adoption procedure and something in the nature of societies there comparable to the adoption societies which we have in the United Kingdom.
I have no hesitation whatsoever in associating myself with what the hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Page) said in reply to the interjection by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Walsall, North (Mr. W. Wells). Yes, it means that certain countries will be denied the facility, or the privilege, of receiving British children for eventual adoption there. I agree that that is a limitation, but I would prefer a limitation of that kind, and to say that certain countries may come within the ambit of the Clause and others may be excluded, to having the appalling situation in which children may be sent to other countries where there is no legal provision of any kind for their protection if certain undesirable consequences arise.
I referred on Second Reading to countries where there is no law of adoption, and reference was made in Committee to

the difficulties which might arise when, for instance, an adopted child became a mental defective in the United States and as a result could be deported by the United States authorities. The law governing adoption varies from State to State in the United States. There is no Federal law.
If difficulties of this kind can arise in a civilised country like the United States, how much more are difficulties likely to arise in a country like Colombia, for example, where the law requires that if a child is born to the adopting couple after the adoption, that adoption must be ended? Again, in Bolivia, Peru and Brazil the adopting parents must be 50 years of age. We must realise the undesirable and dangerous possibilities that exist. I hope that the Government will be disposed to accept what I consider to be a most reasonable Amendment, which has been put forward in a most reasonable way by the hon. Member for Crosby and the hon. Member for Edinburgh, South.

Mr. J. E. B. Hill: I should like to associate myself with what has been said about the Clause. It is a Clause of very considerable difficulty. I should prefer that we should have a further look at it and leave it out of the Bill for the moment, because I do not think that all its implications are yet clear. We have taken the whole Bill in the House rather quickly. It is only four weeks since the Second Reading debate, at which I was not present because I was abroad. Since that time, and since the Committee stage, a good deal has come to light.

Mr. MacColl: I am sure that the hon. Member would not want to be disrespectful to another place. Is not the whole point of a Second Chamber, which I have never been able to see but have always understood, that to complicated and non-party matters grave and wise men give long attention and, therefore, it was not necessary to take the Bill here in the detail that would have been necessary otherwise? Surely it is not suggested that the Bill has not been properly considered in another place.

Mr. Lipton: May I point out to my hon. Friend that this is the revising Chamber in this connection?

Mr. Hill: The trouble is that the ball has started from the opposite end. I would have preferred it if the Bill had started in this Chamber. We should then have had the great advantage of a more leisurely revision. We have had the clock, and the Parliamentary calendar, against us.
If we cannot look at this again and deal with the new principle of foreign adoption separately, and get it right, I will support the Amendments and will formally move the one standing in my name, in page 15, line 23.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Order. We will not do that until we reach the Amendment, but we can discuss them all now.

Mr. Hill: The broad purpose of the Amendments is to strengthen the safeguards. All that has happened so far, both in another place and here, has been to emphasise the need for adequate safeguards. The best phrase is that of the Lord Chancellor himself, "The most stringent safeguards." I am not persuaded that the safeguards in the Bill are sufficient, and I am not really persuaded that our Amendments go as far as, given more time, we might be able to secure.
The classic difficulty is that we cannot legislate to provide effective safeguards in another sovereign country, and therefore we cannot ensure that the process of adoption will be completed even if there is a satisfactory adoption law. That is an important point in the case of adoptions, for this reason. In this country an adoption is final in one legal act. It means that the adopters, by this act, not only secure permanent possession of the child for their own as against the natural parents and the rest of the world, but at the same time they give to the child all the advantages and privileges and rights of a natural child in one complete and reciprocal legal act.
The difficulty about the provision adoption order is that when it is made by the decision of the judge, the adopting parents have that child to take out of the jurisdiction for their own as against losing it to any other third party, but they are not bound by the same obligation to provide for that child and to give it permanent rights in their own family at the same time. Therefore, they are exposed to the temptation of second thoughts. They have an opportunity to

resile from their intention and that, I submit, is a considerable temptation—to wait and see how it turns out. There is nothing we can do legally to force them to complete the adoption procedure. I accept that. What I would hope is that we would try to secure that all foreign cases are, as it were, routed through, channelled through, hooked on to—whatever the phrase may be, because it is hard to get the right legal term—the welfare and adoption agencies in the countries concerned and internationally which already exist. If I felt we could ensure that cases use these facilities, then we would be providing the most stringent safeguards that are available. We would be calling in aid such other safeguards, mainly voluntary, mainly administrative, to reinforce the law.
1.45 p.m.
Considering the first Amendment and whether there are suitable adoption laws, I would like to draw the attention of the House to an exceedingly valuable report which has come to me since the Committee stage of this Bill. It is the Report of a European Expert Group at Geneva under the United Nations on Inter-country Adoption. This Report lists a series of principles that ought to be observed in inter-country adoptions, and I quote Principle 11 with regard to the first Amendment. It states that:
… care must be given to assuring adequate protection of the child in his new country, that in view of the difficulty of exercising guardianship functions across natural boundaries, the value of the former legal guardianship needs to be examined; that legal responsibility for the child in the new country should be established promptly.
Then there is an explanatory paragraph which, if there were more time, I would read. However, the point is that it is agreed on an international level, by experts considering this problem, that every possible step should be taken to secure that the child moving across boundaries is effectively adopted. Principle 12 states that:
… steps must be taken to ensure that the adoption is legally valid in both countries.
It goes on to say:
There are some countries, and parts of other countries, where adoptions by their nationals completed abroad are not automatically recognised. Some countries require that the adoption of their children by nationals of other countries must be carried out in accordance with the law where the


adoptive parents reside; in others, such adoptions must conform to their own adoption laws; while in still others, provisions relating to parents are controlled by the law of their country and those relating to the child by the law of the child's country. It is clear that the status of a child, placed for adoption with nationals of another country can be protected both in his new and in his native country only if the laws and regulations of the countries concerned are clearly understood in advance. In this respect also, an inter-country placement can be protected if the services and experience of a specialised international agency are used from the beginning.
This paragraph really poses the problem. There is a limit in law, but a great deal more could be done if we could ensure use of the international agencies. Whether we can require them legally to be used is the difficulty. As the Clause stands, the only safeguards we have are that there should be six months' residence in this country by the prospective foreign parents. This is twice the probationary period required in an ordinary English adoption. That obviously is an improvement, but it makes the process more difficult and more expensive but not necessarily any safer for the child to be adopted.
For the rest, we are told that satisfactory rules of court will be drawn up. My comment on this is that the rules of court are not subject to scrutiny or debate by this House. They can be altered without our knowledge in the future, and in any event they are only rules of procedure and, therefore, do not meet the great need for ensuring follow-up procedure.
It may be said that the guardian ad litem will look at all the matters to which I have referred, but he need not come into the picture until a comparatively late stage, because his inquiries are directed towards the hearing and therefore he will not be concerned at another critical stage in a foreign adoption, which is the very beginning, that there should be a satisfactory placement. The child should go to a family not only with which it will get on well but into a family where the foreign home circumstances are known to be satisfactory.
There is a great deal of evidence one could give on this point but it is unnecessary because the problem is all too clear. It would be desirable if those foreign home circumstances were investigated at the very earliest stage, before the prospective foreign adopters start the

somewhat arduous process of coming to this country and setting up a home for six months, which is not easy. That strengthens the argument, I submit, for our trying to secure from the very earliest stages some organisation being brought into the picture so that the whole adoption is run on the right lines, including the vital stage of the initial placement and the ultimate stage, followed by a procedure by which in the foreign country it should be possible to get the prospective adoptors to commit themselves legally to carrying the adoption through when the child arrives in the country. It would also cover the very important procedural problems that could exist with regard to immigration laws and like matters.
A great deal has been done on an inter-country level already by one international agency, International Social Service, to which reference has already been made, which is dealing with the methods of processing adopted children in the United States and different countries. It has worked out a system by which, operating on no less than seven distinct and useful principles, the actual procedure includes 13 separate stages, all of which are important when we examine them. If any were omitted, the adoption might get into either technical or really serious trouble, with the result that the child could be misplaced and unhappy.
There is no requirement in this Bill that this procedure has to be used, and that is the whole burden of our argument If, as I very much hope, the first two Amendments will be accepted, I still hope that the last one will also be accepted, because there would be a check through consular officials certifying reports in the foreign countries on what the welfare agency is doing. I think that, through administrative processes, this would help to bridge the gap between our own laws, jurisdiction and complete security, which at the moment, is the weakness of this Clause.

Mr. John Hobson: I desire to speak to the Amendment which stands on the Notice Paper in my name—in page 14, line 37, at the end, insert:
(2) The court shall not make any such order in favour of an applicant unless—

(i) it is satisfied by the applicant, either—

(a) that the applicant is a British subject or a Commonwealth citizen; or


(b) that the relationship between the applicant and the infant is one to be found in either the female or the male columns of the table of kindred and affinity of the prohibited degrees of marriage annexed to the Book of Common Prayer of the Church of England, whether the infant is a male or a female, whether the relationship is by the half blood or the whole blood and whether the relationship is legitimate or illegitimate; or
(c) that there are special circumstances or reasons why the infant should have the opportunity of being adopted by a person who is neither a British subject nor a Commonwealth citizen and that it is for the benefit of the infant that this should be done; and

(ii) evidence is tendered on behalf of a local authority or registered adoption society in support of the application.

(3) The court on making any such order shall impose a condition and shall require the applicant by bond in such sum as it thinks fit to undertake—

(a) that apart from applying for an adoption order in the country of his domicile the applicant will take all such steps and will do or refrain from doing all such things on behalf of the infant as may be necessary to preserve until the infant's twenty-first birthday the citizenship and status of the infant in the same condition as it was on the making of the order in England or Scotland; and
(b) that the applicant will report to the Registrar General such particulars as may be prescribed of any adoption order subsequently made outside England and Scotland in respect of the infant.

In agreement with hon. Members who have already spoken, I desire to emphasise the great importance of Clause 24. It replaces what was previously known as a licensing system, but it is, in fact, a licensing export system. We may call it a provisional adoption order, but it is nothing of the sort. It is an export licence in respect of a British child, and it is for that reason that it is of the utmost importance that we should see that we allow an export of a British child only in circumstances which are really justified.
The Hurst Committee, which dealt with this matter very shortly, was considering three categories of persons from abroad, every one of whom was a British subject, except for an incidental reference to United States Service men who might be serving in this country. Under the provisions of the Adoption Act, 1950, one could get a licence to take a child overseas for the purpose of adoption only if

the child was to be adopted by a British subject. Now we propose, in Clause 24 as it now stands, to export children born in this country to any country in the world with very little control indeed over the way in which the courts should exercise their discretion in granting their permission.
It is true that there is a six months' probationary period, but it is nothing like as important a probationary period as is now provided for in the case of ordinary adoption, because under Clause 24 only one person can be the applicant. There is no provision at all by which spouses can apply jointly for an export licence for a child. As the Hurst Committee pointed out, it is very important indeed that during the probationary period, if two spouses are ultimately to adopt a child, they should take part in the probationary period; whereas, under Clause 24 as it stands at present, one spouse, a foreigner, could make an application and obtain an order without any necessity whatever for the other spouse to have been resident in this country or to have taken any part in the probationary period. That is something which is not normally provided for in ordinary cases of adoption.
The Hurst Committee, in dealing with this matter, assumed—or so one may suppose—that the authority which should grant such export licences would be the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, and the Committee expressly said that the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate had acquired a very great deal of knowledge and experience in these matters. But the Bill as it stands provides that the High Court, or any county court judge or any sheriff in Scotland can deal with this matter, and many of them, no doubt, will have little or no experience of the difficulties to be met with in exporting children from this country. Indeed, this provision of the Bill is based on paragraph 170 in the Hurst Committee's Report, which says:
We see no sufficient reason why licences should, as at present, be granted only to British subjects. We are confident that the licensing authority would not grant a licence to foreign nationals who could not show special reasons for their application.
We may perhaps have confidence in the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate only granting such a licence to a foreign national who could show special reasons, but when county court judges and sheriffs in Scotland are also involved, I should prefer to see an express restriction of that


sort put into the Bill to provide that, if a foreign national is to take a child out of the country, he should do so only in circumstances in which there are special reasons or circumstances.
My Amendment provides for what I regard as a matter of great importance. It is that we should restrict the taking of children out of this country for the purposes of adoption to British subjects and citizens of the Commonwealth, except in two special cases. The first exception is where there is a blood relationship or a close connection. Those who have read my proposed Amendment will see that the prohibited degrees of consanguinity for the purposes of marriage, which are fairly widespread, provide a reasonable class of persons within a family who might assert that they have some sort of blood relationship or connection. Therefore, a person from abroad ought to prove either that he is a British subject or a Commonwealth citizen, or that he is a person within the degrees of consanguinity prohibited for the purposes of marriage. The second exception is in cases where there are special reasons or circumstances why a foreign national, rather than a British subject or a Commonwealth citizen, should be allowed to adopt a British child.
The first two of these conditions arises from an earlier report of the Horsbrugh Committee of 1937 (Cmd. 5499), in which on page 32 the Committee said:
In these circumstances, in view of the difficulties of making sufficient inquiries, the impossibility of ensuring that the adoption will be legalised, and the particularly unhappy consequences which may result if for any reason difficulties occur in the future, we have seriously considered whether adoption societies and other agencies should be prohibited from sending children abroad for adoption in any circumstances.
That Committee then dealt with domiciled British subjects not resident in this country, a matter with which Clause 23 now deals, and went on to say:
There are greater dangers in the case of adoption by British people in the Dominions and Colonies. But we should be most reluctant to close the door to such adoptions, which do not involve the child's upbringing in an alien community nor any possibility of loss of nationality.
Special considerations also apply to adoptions by relatives, whether of British nationality or otherwise, and whether or not domiciled in the United Kingdom.

But with these exceptions, we think the disadvantages of adoptions abroad greatly outweigh any possible advantages and we recommend that adoption societies and other adoption agencies should be entirely prohibited from arranging adoptions in which the child will be taken abroad except where the adopters are British subjects.
My Amendment goes slightly further than that, because it incorporates a proposal of the Hurst Committee that, where there are special circumstances or reasons, a foreigner should be allowed to take a child abroad for the purpose of adopting it overseas.
2.0 p.m.
Time presses and I need not elaborate on my Amendment any further. It speaks for itself, but I urge on the House that some limitations of this sort should be placed on judges who are to exercise their discretion to allow British children born in this country to be taken to countries overseas, where they may lose their citizenship and where there is no control whatever over what happens to them, nor over the persons who take them out of the country.

Mr. Younger: I want first to say a few words about the Amendment in the names of my right hon. Friends and myself, that in page 15, line 23:
This idea is incorporated in the much longer Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. John Hobson).
As those who were members of the Standing Committee will realise, this Amendment arises out of a discussion of an Amendment moved in Committee by my hon. Friend the Member for Barking (Mr. Hastings) who, unfortunately, cannot be here today, and who wanted to make it compulsory for the local authority or adoption society to be a respondent in adoption cases. Since then, in common with many hon. Members, I have received further evidence that adoption societies, as well as some local authorities, are very worried about this matter.
The hon. Lady's reply to the Amendment in Committee was one which had a certain appeal to me. She suggested that the idea was a bit too rigid, because it would deprive third parties in all circumstances of taking an initiative. That seemed to be going rather too far. It was also said that in any event local


authorities would always be respondents and that there was no point in making adoption societies respondents unless they knew something about the case.
The hon. Lady said:
The local authority will always, as a respondent to any application, have an opportunity to oppose or investigate as it thought fit."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee A, 15th July, 1958; c. 129.]
I accept that, but we should like to go a little further and make it certain that the local authority would have to play an active part, and not, as might otherwise be the case, simply be a passive respondent. We want to make sure that the local authority will make these investigations and that if it does not do so, the proceedings will not be able to be consummated. That is something to which we attach some importance.
I realise, of course, that in common with many of the other Amendments which we are here discussing, these are things which could conceivably be dealt with in some way other than by putting them into the Bill. Many of us will have much sympathy with most of the points of substance raised in the Amendments, although sometimes we will not be sure that they are necessarily things which should be incorporated in the Bill. They might be much better dealt with in rules and, in some cases, best left to the discretion of the court, since the court can be trusted to exercise reasonable common sense.
I do not want to pick out each Amendment separately and to say what I feel about it, but the long Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for Warwick and Leamington is somewhat too detailed and too restrictive and I have some doubts whether the hon. Members who support it will be as successful, as it is obviously hoped, in finding a means of enforcing an undertaking upon somebody who has already left our jurisdiction and who is not domiciled here. However, most of the other points seem to be things which should be covered somehow, and I hope that even if she cannot accept the Amendment, the hon. Lady will say something more than we have yet had about how the Home Office proposes to cover these matters.
The hon. and learned Member was quite right when he said that the implica-

tions of these provisional orders were not clear. I must confess to having been somewhat disappointed so far in the evidence which we have had of the authorities having thought out the numerous snags which arise. I do not share what seems to be the general prejudice in some quarters against the Clause. I want the Clause to be kept in the Bill. It is right that there should be provision for these things to be done, but there are many snags which require safeguards, and I am disappointed by the evidence which we have had of the length to which official thinking has gone on these matters.

Miss Vickers: I rise to speak to the Amendments in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Crosby (Mr. Page).
Those of us who were members of the Standing Committee and who were present for the Second Reading debate and who have a considerable interest in these matters were somewhat disturbed in the later stages of the Committee to realise that the Government had no intention of limiting provisional orders to nationals of countries where there were adoption orders.
I might have been slow on the uptake on that, but, from what I have heard, even the adoption societies did not know that that was to be the case. I want to put most of my remarks in the form of questions so that we can be assured that, before a child is adopted overseas, parental consent is required.
The parent of a child in this country should give consent before a child is adopted overseas, and even an infant parent should be consulted. Even an infant parent can develop an intense love for a child and may be forced by her mother or grandmother, who is not happy about the child being illegitimate, to get rid of it quite quickly. If it is fostered and is to go overseas, the effects could be damaging.
Are the parents of the child to know to which country the child is to be sent? Is there to be any form of central register so that we can know to which countries the children have gone? What will happen if both adopting parents die at the same time? What will happen if, when they get the child to their own country, they decide that they do not want it? Will the child then be sent back


to this country? Whose child will it ultimately become? If it is not wanted in the country to which it is taken and it is not legally adopted—and in many countries there are no societies for the prevention of cruelty to children—what will happen to it then?
We were told that the child would retain its British nationality. If there were a war and the country were overrun—as happened with France in the last war—which nationality would the child take? Having had much to do with civilian prisoners of war, I know that that complication arises when people have to be interned. That was especially the case in the Far East with people of dual nationality. I know of an instance of an Irishman in Hong Kong. He came from the Republic of Ireland and the Japanese told him that he need not be interned. He said that he had never gone under the Irish Republican flag and he opted to remain in prison. But it might work the other way. If there is another war between Germany and Great Britain and France is overrun, will those children who have been adopted by French parents and who have retained their British nationality be liable to internment?
I would draw attention to a letter, written by Mary Ellison, which appeared in today's Daily Telegraph. I should like to quote from the letter because, during the Second Reading debate, the hon. Member for Rossendale (Mr. Anthony Greenwood) referred to the excellent book which she wrote, called, "The Adopted Child." In her letter she raises some points which worry me considerably. The letter is headed, "Market In Children: Still Gaps in Proposals on Adoption," and she says:
It has already been noted in the Press that the status of the adopted child varies considerably in different parts of the world.
Here she emphasises what many hon. Members have said, namely, that the child will not be able to be legally adopted if it goes to certain countries. She goes on to say:
The Hurst Report points out that 'Over the whole country only about one-quarter of the adoption orders made are in respect of adoptions arranged by societies or local authorities'".
I mentioned this matter in Committee, in referring to the fears of many welfare workers. A young woman may hand over her child to an American serviceman.

Under the rules of the International Social Service Bureau, if that American has looked after the child for a period of one year in this country it would be extremely difficult for a court to refuse to agree to an adoption unless cruelty to the child could be shown. I am therefore very doubtful about the wisdom of many provisions of the Clause.
We have heard a lot about the adoption of Roman Catholic and coloured children. I want to put in a special plea on behalf of the coloured children. We must remember that in this country coloured children are usually not full-blooded. The ones that we want to get adopted usually have a white mother and a coloured father. I have lived in countries overseas, including India and Indonesia, and I realise the great difficulty under which the half-caste lives. In many cases they do not wish to be considered as coloured children.
In this country it is usual for a child to go with its mother, and these children feel white. This fact has been shown very clearly in India, where, although we did not favour intermarriage, a certain number of children of mixed marriages were born. When they grew up they always wanted to be thought of as European. I do not think that the Bill will be of any help if it adversely affects the lives of the children. These children will not be happy if the adoption is carried out in this way.
2.15 p.m.
We must try to safeguard the many children who may go through third-party adoptions. As I have pointed out, this is the most numerous class of adoptions at present. Unless we can ensure that further precautions will be taken in the case of children who leave this country, the main object of the Bill, which is to safeguard children, will not be attained. Even more third-party adoptions will take place, because that will be the easiest way to slip through this network. There was considerable confusion about the question in Committee, and no effective safeguard has been written into the Bill. I hope that my hon. Friend will consider the Amendment in the names of my hon. Friend the Member for Crosby and myself because that will go a long way towards safeguarding the position.

Mr. Janner: I have listened with great care to a number of speeches. I do not think that anybody in the House would want to say that this is not an extremely important debate. It is a debate at a late stage of a Bill which deals with a problem of very grave concern to many people. A Clause of this nature is necessary; the real question we have to decide is: What precautions will be taken to ensure that a child is properly attended to so that it may eventually have a happy and useful life?
I am interested in one point which was raised by the hon. and learned Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. John Hobson). There is something to be said for the idea of putting an adopter under a bond which may be enforceable in his country of domicile. This would be a deterrent against any kind of undesirable action. If it were possible to sue such an individual under that bond, in any country as well as this one, he would have to watch his position carefully. The question is beset by innumerable difficulties, but we must find some way by which at least a financial hold can be put upon an individual to make him comply with certain obligations—a hold which can be enforced in most countries, if not all, and which could certainly be enforced against that individual if he came within the jurisdiction of any country with a law similar to ours.
We must be careful not to lose sight of the importance of the Clause. With all the precautions we take there are bound to be exceptional cases where parents, foster parents or adoptive parents will not comply with the humane necessities of looking after children. It is true that many prospective adoptive parents outside this county could provide better facilities for the upbringing of a child than any which that child could obtain from certain adoptive parents in this country. It is a very great responsibility to allow a child to go outside the jurisdiction of our own courts and the supervision of our own welfare bodies without taking every conceivable precaution, not only by these discretionary methods, but, if possible, by compulsion on the individual adopter.
The point made about the two parents is a very substantial one. It may very well be that the parent who wants to

adopt the child is an admirable person, but the condition of the other spouse, from a psychological if not from a financial or physical standpoint, may be entirely different. These things cannot be left to chance. We have to do the best we can to cover the various contingencies that may arise and must be as satisfied as possible that the child's interests are properly safeguarded.
It is true that regulations may be altered from time to time, but it is also perfectly true that Acts may be altered, and one cannot be too sure that another country's adoption laws at present similar to our own, may not be altered. Therefore, as far as possible, we should incorporate safeguards in legislation rather than rely on what I call discretionary methods. I hope that proper weight will be given to that. The intention of the Government in this connection is right. It is proper that people who are decent and good, who have good intentions and believe and hope that they will be able to give some human and humane assistance to an adopted child, shall have their wishes—which, of course, must be examined—attended to. Nevertheless, I hope that some additional provision will be made in the Bill fully to protect the interests of the children.

Miss Hornsby-Smith: We have had a very interesting debate on this Clause, which has certainly aroused the greatest discussion throughout our proceedings. However, I must confess that listening to some of the speeches one might gain the impression that its intention was not to protect the child—which is the whole basis of our introduction of this system of provisional adoption orders—but the very reverse, so perhaps I may be forgiven if I go into some detail to try to explain what will happen in the operation of this machinery.
First, we have to recognise that the Hurst Committee thought the licensing system undesirable. I am sure that hon. Members would be just as vehement in their protest if we were debating the licensing system under which the child is sent abroad unseen by the potential adopters, where the child does not know whether it will get on with the adoptive parents, and where the adoptive parents do not know that the child will be satisfactory from the family point of view.
By this Clause we are providing the greatest safeguard, in that for six whole months those parents will be under the direct supervision of the local authority—

Mr. John Hobson: Is it not correct that Clause 24 provides only for an applicant and makes no provision for joint application by two spouses, such as is provided for under ordinary adoption?

Miss Hornsby-Smith: I had intended to deal with that point in due course, but for the moment, I am glad to say that my hon. and learned Friend is wrong.
It is true that by this Clause very great responsibilities will fall on the guardian ad litem, but hon. Members ought to appreciate that very similar inquiries have to be made abroad in the case of the emigration of children, and of licences for children. In emigration cases, which are very parallel, it is not at all uncommon for the guardian ad litem to get in touch with the local authority responsible for welfare in the town or city from which the application has come; for his opposite number in that city to make very full inquiry, and to send back, through the consul, an accredited statement of the results of the inquiry. The guardian ad litem, under the present rules—and I shall have a word to say about the rules which the Lord Chancellor proposes to apply in connection with provisional adoption orders—has to provide very detailed and extensive information to the court about the general conditions, the financial position, the religion of and a whole host of items about the family that is taking the emigrant or, in this case, the child for adoption.
I know that my hon. Friend has suggested that the services of adoption societies should be used, but how do we know that adoption societies abroad are as well controlled and supervised as ours are; that an adoption society there has the machinery and the wide experience necessary, or that it is not, in fact, only a body which has some rather good notepaper and a part-time typist dealing with matters in a small town? I am sure that we should not under-estimate the ability of these highly skilled officers who act as guardians ad litem, who are either fully-trained welfare officers or, in Scotland, as I believe, qualified solicitors.
Prospective adopters will not lightly enter into a process which means that they have to leave their homes and their jobs for six months to come to this country. They have to live here, under the eagle eye of what is, to them, a foreign authority. They have to go before what is, to them, a foreign court, and have their circumstances investigated and brought out before what is, to them, a foreign judge. I do not think there is any ground for the use of such terms as "a market in children," or "farming out." This process is, in itself, a very great deterrent to any flippant, idle or unworthy adopter, who must, as I say, for six months be under the skilled eye of the supervising local authority, and then has to go before a British court and prove that be would, in fact, be a worthy adopter.
Dealing with the Amendments in the order in which they have been put down, that in page 14, line 30, suggests that this procedure should apply only when the adoption law in the other country is substantially similar to that in Great Britain, but there are many cases where perfectly good and worthy prospective adopters from abroad may be able to show special circumstances in which they would like to adopt a British child, but would be debarred from doing so, if the Amendment were accepted, because the adoption law of their country of domicile was not akin to ours. For example, I understand that in France, in Denmark and in Switzerland, a married couple may not adopt a child if they already have a legitimate child of their own. On the other hand, we may think that to join a family where there is already one child would be a very good thing for an adopted child. There are many foreign people working in this country. Hon. Members will know that it is not at all unusual for illegitimate children to be born in this country, children who are half foreign by blood and sometimes wholly foreign by parentage and only British by virtue of the fact that they were born in this country.
2.30 p.m.
Are we to say that if a French woman has a child in this country and subsequently marries one of her own countrymen, they are not to be entitled to adopt that child merely because under French law a family cannot adopt a child if they already have one legitimate child? There will not be many of these cases. Are we going to deprive that sort of


family, a European family who could provide a good home for a child who may be, on one side of the family and sometimes on both, of foreign parentage even though it is British in law?

Mr. Page: I recognise that the point which my hon. Friend is making is that a British woman who has a child by a foreign father—

Miss Hornsby-Smith: No, not necessarily. A foreign mother may be working in this country, and if she has a child born in this territory it is British. She make may take it out of the country but she cannot give it legal adoption because it is a British child, even though both parents may be of foreign nationality.

Mr. Page: I am sorry to pursue the point and interrupt my hon. Friend, but I think we should get the matter clear. The mother, in those circumstances, can take the child abroad to her own country and then the child becomes subject to the laws of that country and may or may not be adopted. That does not seem to me to be a case in point. Our Amendments are directed to the removal of a British child from its parents to some adoptive parents abroad.

Miss Hornsby-Smith: My hon. Friend has missed the important point. If I may say so, many of the points made today were made in Committee and I endeavoured to answer them. Either I have been very bad at answering them or else hon. Members have been too bored to listen. There are many children born in this country—many in the care of the L.C.C., for example, and other authorities—who are of at least half and sometimes wholly of foreign parentage. It may not be the natural mother who wishes to take the child. My hon. Friend is quite right in saying that the natural mother can take the child abroad. But she may well know that the child is half or wholly of foreign parentage. She may wish it to be brought up in her native country. At present such a child, by virtue of having been born on British soil, is a British subject and cannot be adopted by a family abroad, however worthy.
On Second Reading, my hon. Friend said that there were evasions of the law by the natural mother in taking the child

abroad, leaving it with a family of her choice and then returning to this country without it. One can virtually do very little about that. I believe that the majority of natural mothers, if they know they can give the protection of adoption to a child who for various reasons they do not wish to keep and bring up themselves, would be prepared to invoke the greatest safeguards which are available by way of these provisional adoption orders, and at least feel that they have done their utmost to protect the future of their child by consenting to a provisional adoption order.
I should like to say a word about the inquiry of an adoption society or other adoption authority in the country which has knowledge of the application. I must confess that I think the Amendment is not precise enough in meaning to be suitable for enactment. Even if an adoption society in the country of domicile were informed of the application, it might have no knowledge at all of the adopter's character and circumstances. The requirement of the Amendment would be satisfied if applicants domiciled in France were to inform an adoption society in Marseilles of the application which they proposed to make, even though the applicant might have come from Britanny or may have been living for several years in this country. I think it is so loosely worded that it would not be suitable for enactment and it would not in effect achieve the result that my hon. Friend wants.
I believe that the very responsible professional men who will be appointed as guardians ad litem are far more likely to go to the known reliable and reputable sources for their information—either the responsible welfare and public health authorities in the country to which they are applying, through the consular officer, or to use the well-known international bodies the various denominational bodies and the international adoption societies on whose investigations they know they can rely.
There must be some countries which have very few of what we regard as properly constituted and registered adoption societies. That does not mean that within that country there might not be circumstances where a perfectly reputable applicant who could satisfy the requirements of the court should not in those


special circumstances be permitted to adopt a child. I fully appreciate my hon. Friends' anxieties.
The hon. Member for Norfolk, South (Mr. J. E. B. Hill) fairly made the point that it is not possible for us to legislate to provide sanctions which can apply in another sovereign country, but my right hon. Friend has followed very closely the proceedings on this Bill and he is aware of the anxieties felt and fairly stressed by my hon. Friends about the need for safeguarding the welfare of the child in applications for provisional adoption orders. He has discussed this matter with the noble Lord the Lord Chancellor and will draw the noble Lord's attention to all that has been said on this matter today. Hon. Members will appreciate that the Lord Chancellor cannot say in advance of the Bill being passed what form the rules of court will take, but I am sure we can rely on his readiness to do everything that is reasonable and practicable to meet the views which have been expressed today. Hon. Members will be aware that the Lord Chancellor gave an undertaking in another place that the rules would be no less stringent than those which require the full investigations that are made in connection with ordinary adoption orders.
One hon. Member made the point that under Clause 24 (4) there was no provision for joint applications. I assured him that this was not so because that Clause applies most of the provisions of the principal Act and of the Bill about ordinary adoption orders to provisional adoption orders. It includes in those provisions Section 1 (2) of the 1950 Act which provides for joint applications. I can assure the hon. Gentleman that that point is covered.
Some hon. Members suggested that no prospective adopters other than those from the British Commonwealth should be allowed to adopt a child. I think that would be an unduly narrow outlook and I do not think that on reflection this House would suggest that there is no foreign parent who can be entrusted with the care of a child before any British parent. That would be an unfortunate suggestion and conclusion to emerge from this debate, and I do not think it is one with which hon. Members generally agree. The procedure will be a costly process. It will not be an easy matter for foreigners to present their case before an English

court and stay for six months under the supervision of an English local authority.
I think that the few cases which will be dealt with under this procedure may well include very genuine and worthy cases where often the parents themselves may wish a certain family with whom they have long-standing friendship to adopt a child abroad. Most of the cases will not be from family to family. They will concern children who have already been placed in the care of a local authority, or cases in which the mother with an illegitimate child has no desire or intention of making herself responsible for that child in the future.
So far as consent is concerned, the same provisions will apply as under the ordinary adoption order procedure. The child cannot be placed without consent. The parent will know if it is a provisional adoption order and that, therefore, the application is from applicants who normally live abroad or live in this country but will ultimately intend to take the child abroad. They will be aware of those circumstances. They will have the same rights as under ordinary adoption orders procedure in withholding consent, with only the exceptions which are enshrined in the Act, where the child has been abandoned and the mother cannot be found or the parents are incapable of making a decision or, indeed, where they are unreasonably withholding consent.
I do not believe that in practice the courts will grant provisional adoption orders to any applicant of whatever nationality unless there are very special circumstances which justify such a course. Hon. Members know our courts well enough and the very responsible view that they take on the protection of children to know full well that they will take the greatest care in matters of national compatibility, in questions of religion or colour and all those things which go to build up a good family and community life.
A point was raised on the Amendment in page 14, line 37. The court cannot make any adoption order, provisional or otherwise, unless it is satisfied that it will be for the benefit of the child. I believe that much of the Amendment was based upon the assumption that, other things being equal, the child should always go to a Commonwealth family.
Reference was made also to the requirement of a bond. There is the difficulty of the British courts not having power to impose any sanction on a foreign national within his own country. In the the absence of information about whether the applicant had carried out his obligation, it is not clear whether there would be a liability on the courts to find it out. It might be difficult to find it out. I do not think that it would be possible to enshrine in the Bill a provision that a bond should be required, with liabilities and sanctions on an applicant who would not, probably, thereafter be living under the laws of this country.

Mr. Janner: Has the hon. Lady consulted the Law Officers as to whether there is any alternative method by which a financial obligation might be imposed, in consideration of the adoption being granted, which would be enforceable in another country? That is really what is behind the idea of a bond. It is not merely a matter of enforcing a bond in this country but placing a financial obligation upon an individual if he does not comply with certain provisions, having entered into the particular document and in consideration of something granted to him.

Miss Vickers: It was stated in the Washington Senate a little while ago that, from the Middle West to New York and from the East to Florida, children were being sold at prices from £700 to £100,000. That is the sort of thing one wants to safeguard against so that when the child grows older he is not passed on to somebody else for some consideration.

Miss Hornsby-Smith: My hon. Friend is really underrating the very full investigation to be made and the evidence to be produced to the courts by the guardian ad litem about the circumstances, background and conduct of the applicants, in addition to which those applicants will, as I have reminded the House, have to be here for six months. They will have to pay their fare, perhaps across the Atlantic and, perhaps, half way across America, and return. It will, indeed, be an extremely costly business to undertake, and would not be embarked upon lightly or without any real desire or intention to adopt a British child.
The hon. Member for Leicester, North-West (Mr. Janner) is far more knowledgeable

about international law than I, but I believe that another point arises in connection with the requiring of a bond from a prospective adopter. It would really be an attempt to exercise control over the relationship between adopter and child after the order has been made and after the applicant has left the jurisdiction. In the first place, it is impracticable to exercise any effective control of real benefit to the child. We must satisfy ourselves, when the parties are here, that the applicant is a worthy one who measures up to the standards we have laid down. Secondly, any attempt to exercise control, however unsuccessful, would tend to foster the very evil that we wish to curb. It would create the impression that the relationship between adopter and child is not close and is not irrevocable. One of the cardinal principles of adoption has been that, once the order has been made and the adoption completed, the child is, to all intents and purposes, one of the new family just as is a natural child.

Mr. Janner: I am much obliged to the hon. Lady for giving way again. That is not quite the point we are driving at. After all, if a person adopts a child in this country and afterwards is cruel to the child or does not do what is proper, there are laws by which he may be deprived of the custody of the child. The child can be put into a home, to foster parents, and so forth.
I hope that the hon. Lady will consider again what we have suggested. I believe it to be well worth while. It is not a slur on the adopting parents. On the contrary, I should have thought that they would be prepared, in the interests of the child, to submit to some such arrangement. We are asking for some kind of preventive measure so that the kind of treatment and protection which is given to our children here will, after adoption, still be in some way enforceable in another country.

Miss Hornsby-Smith: If the adoption law in the other country was identical and if we could enforce the sanction of a bond, the hon. Member's suggestion might, I think, be a little more practicable, but, on the face of it, I think we must make our decision in this country after the six months' residence. I believe that that six months' residence


has far more importance than many hon. Members have admitted. The only reliable safeguard is to ensure that adoption orders are made in favour of reliable people. For this, we trust to the full investigations, through proper and reputable channels, by the guardian ad litem. We trust the courts, in placing upon them a great responsibility in coming to a decision.
The Government are confident that the Bill provides adequate machinery for enabling the courts to have before them information which will allow them to exercise their discretion wisely. They have, after all, a very wide experience in ordinary adoption, and they are likely to exercise even more stringency in hearing applications of this kind. I know that hon. Members have very sincere reservations about this—indeed, I have discussed hardly any other subject during this week—but I believe that this new procedure affords a much better protection than the present licensing system. If an unmarried mother has made up her

Mr. Speaker: Unless any other hon. Member whose Amendment was discussed with the last one wishes me to put it to the House, I shall call the hon. Member for Widnes (Mr. MacColl) to move his Amendment.

mind that she will not bring up her child and she feels in her heart that it is best that the responsibility should be undertaken in a Canadian home or an American home, she will know that she can give the child the legal protection of a provisional adoption order.

In view of the assurance given by my right hon. Friend and the assurance from my noble Friend the Lord Chancellor that the rules of court will certainly be as stringently drawn, probably more widely and stringently, in respect of applications for provisional orders than the present rules are for ordinary adoption orders, I ask hon. Members to accept our view. Certainly, all the comments, questions and reservations which hon. Members have expressed will be taken into account, but I very sincerely hope that the Amendments to the Clause will not be pressed.

Question put, That "or" stand part of the Bill.

The House divided: Ayes 82, Noes 8.

Division No. 205.]
AYES
[2.54 p.m.


Agnew, Sir Peter
Grimond, J.
Oswald, T.


Aitken, W. T.
Gurden, Harold
Peel, W. J.


Armstrong, C. W.
Hall, Rt. Hn. Glenvil (Colne Valley)
Powell, J. Enoch


Barber, Anthony
Harrison, Col. J. H. (Eye)
Price, David (Eastleigh)


Batsford, Brian
Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel
Redmayne, M.


Bevins, J. R. (Toxteth)
Heath, Rt. Hon. E. R. G.
Renton, D. L. M.


Bingham, R. M.
Hope, Lord John
Reynolds, G. W.


Bishop, F. P.
Hornsby-Smith, Miss M. P.
Ridsdale, J. E.


Blyton, W. R.
Hughes Hallett, Vice-Admiral J.
Robens, Rt. Hon. A.


Bossom, Sir Alfred
Hughes-Young, M. H. C.
Robertson, Sir David


Butler, Rt. Hn. R. A. (Saffron Waiden)
Hylton-Foster, Rt. Hon. Sir Harry
Robinson, Kenneth (Sir. Pencras, N.)


Cole, Norman
Iremonger, T. L.
Sharples, R. C.


Cordeaux, Lt.-Col. J. K.
Janner, B.
Spens, Rt. Hn. Sir P. (Kens'gt'n, S.)


Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col. O. E.
Jeger, Mrs. Lena (Holbn &amp; St. Pncs, S.)
Stuart, Rt. Hon. James (Moray)


Cunningham, Knox
Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)
Teeling, W.


Currie, G. B. H.
Johnson, Dr. Donald (Carlisle)
Thompson, R. (Croydon, S.)


Dance, J. C. G.
Johnson, Eric (Blackley)
Turner, H. F. L.


D'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry
Kirk, P. M.



Deer, G.
Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H.
Wall, Patrick


Doughty, C. J. A.
Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh
Webster, David


du Cann, E. D. L.
MacColl, J. E.
Wells, William (Walsall, N.)


Erroll, F. J.
MacDermot, Niall
White, Mrs. Eirene (E. Flint)


Fletcher, Eric
Macmillan, Rt. Hn. Harold (Bromley)
Whitelaw, W. S. I.


Gammans, Lady
Macmillan, Maurice (Halifax)
Williams, W. R. (Openshaw)


Glyn, Col. Richard H.
Maddan, Martin
Younger, Rt. Hon. K.


Goodhart, Philip
Maydon, Lt.-Comdr. S. L. C.



Gordon Walker, Rt. Hon. P. C.
Mitchison, G. R.
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Grant, Rt. Hon. W. (Woodside)
Nicolson, N. (B'n'm'th, E. &amp; Chr'ch)
Sir Gerald Wills and Mr. Legh.


Green, A.
Noel-Baker, Rt. Hon. P. (Derby, S.)





NOES


Body, R. F.
Holman, P.



Corfield, Capt. F. V.
Hornby, R. P.
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Hill, John (S. Norfolk)
Hutchison, Michael Clark (E'b'gh, S.)
Mr. Lipton and Mr. Page.


Hobson, John (Warwick &amp; Leam'gt'n)
Vickers, Miss Joan

3.0 p.m.

Mr. MacColl: I beg to move, page 14, line 39, to leave out "or the county court".
I was delighted to find this morning when I came to the House that my hon


Friend the Member for, Brixton (Mr. Lipton) had added his name to my Amendment. We approach this problem from entirely different points of view, and I hope it will not be lost to the hon. Lady the Joint Under-Secretary that there is some significance in the fact that my hon. Friend and I have been able to join hands across a High Court judge. That may well indicate the answer to this difficult problem.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, North-West (Mr. Janner) so clearly said, we have either to restrict the power of the court in making an order or to rely on the court exercising its discretion. We have discussed at great length and rejected the possibility of restricting the power of the court. I agree with the hon. Lady that the other solution is the right one to adopt, and that is why I supported her. I hope she noticed me when I was going through the "Aye" Lobby. I supported her because I agree with her that the answer to this problem is to rely on the discretion of the court. I suggest, however, that if we do that, we require uniformity in the exercise of that discretion and the building up of a considerable amount of experience in this very difficult field.
I make no apology for moving the Amendment at this late stage of the Bill. It occurred to me in Committee when I was listening to the debate when we were wrestling with the problem. It suddenly hit me that this was the answer. The more I think of it, the more convinced I am that it is the answer. I am not naturally prejudiced in favour of the High Court. When we were discussing the question of children of divorced parents and their supervision I fought hard to persuade the House to accept the principle that the work should be done locally by a magistrates' court. I am prejudiced in favour of local jurisdiction, but this is a quite different problem which is essentially international and not local. Therefore, the criticisms which have been made about this suggestion, most of which were criticisms concerning the exercise by the divorce courts of their jurisdiction in respect of the other Bill, are not relevant to this Bill.
The first suggestion was that county court judges have a wide experience of the law of adoption. That, however, is not relevant here, because what we are

considering is the law of international adoption, which is a quite different problem. The fact that a county court judge has much experience of local adoption and of the adoption law in this country is not really the important factor when considering foreign adoptions.
The second point that was made was that witnesses, perhaps in large numbers, might have to come up to London and that this would be an expensive business. The hon. Lady herself, however, has said again and again that one of the sanctions against too easy use of the powers in the Clause is that it is an expensive business. I suggest that when anybody is settling the fate of a child and sending it abroad for ever, the consideration of possible trouble to children's officers in having to come up to London and matters of that sort should not be allowed to weigh.
The hon. Lady said upstairs in Committee that when people had settled in an area, they would be known and, therefore, it was useful to have local evidence of their character. It is not likely that the county court judge would have local knowledge of the character of the people and I am sure that even if he had, it would be improper for him to take it into account. We are not dealing with a problem of general welfare to be discussed around the table, as might be the case in most problems concerning children. We are dealing here with a tricky question of comparative international law.
Again, we are not dealing with people who are living in an area or who may come up out of the area to London to consider the case. These are people who, the hon. Lady said, had had to come to this country and settle down and live here for the qualifying period. It is true that some of them may be on service in this country. It may be more convenient for an airman stationed at, say, Burton-wood to go as a witness to the county court rather than to London, but it is not all that inconvenient for him to do so. He is probably accustomed to coming to London and the fact that he is serving in a certain area does not mean that he is rooted there as a witness. There would be no real hardship for him to come to London if he wanted to adopt the child. Therefore, these negative criticisms which have been made are not relevant.
The question is whether there are any possible advantages in confining the


jurisdiction to the High Court. The first point to be made is that the licensing procedure has been confined to Bow Street and the Chief Magistrate. Therefore, in the case of the licensing procedure, the idea that we build up a corpus of knowledge about the problem of children going abroad has been accepted by the legislature and has become an intrinsic part of the procedure. Therefore, it is going backwards to say that in this, if anything, more drastic procedure of provisional adoption orders we should go back and scatter the jurisdiction all over the country to different county courts.
There is also the danger—perhaps not a great one, but it can happen—that certain county court districts become known for taking these cases rather more lightly or sympathetically than other areas. It is possible for a prospective adopter to select his own county court district. These are not the kind of cases where one is living in an area and, for better or for worse, the local police and the county court judge are taken as part of the facts of life and must be accepted accordingly. In these cases, the prospective adopter comes to this country with the purpose of acquiring a domicile in order to be able to make application. Therefore, it is possible for him to choose where he lives. It may well arise that if adoption brokers were at work, they could advise a person that if he settled in a certain area, the county court judge there was more pro-foreigner than the county court judge in another area and the prospective adopter was more likely to get his order. That would be an undesirable state of affairs. It is another strong argument for saying that the jurisdiction should be placed in the hands of a single High Court judge.
The hon. Lady said upstairs that this would be too much work for one judge. I was surprised to hear that. The whole point about this procedure, I thought, was that there would not be many cases and that they would be the exceptional ones. Therefore, I was very much surprised to hear that there would be a heavy load on the judge. If it were so I do not think this is really an argument for more than spreading it among some of the High Court judges.
But a High Court judge in the Law Courts, with all the professional advice available to him, and specialising in these

matters, is more likely to deal with a case accurately and carefully than the very busy county court judge who has to deal with it between a couple of eviction cases and an action brought on a civil debt or something of that sort. This is essentially a Chancery proceeding which ought to be looked at very carefully by a very experienced judge.
The kind of question which will arise will not primarily be one of the local situation of the child or anything of that sort. It will be other such questions as, "What is the law of adoption in the other country? What is its law of citizenship? Will there be a conflict of law between the country of the adopting parents and that of our own country? What is to be the way of resolving that conflict? What kind of social services are available in that country?" My hon. Friend the Member for Brixton cited the case of Colombia where the rules of the law of adoption presumably prevented parents from adopting another child. Presumably one would have to have a very strong case before the court would consider it to be a proper one for adoption. What the court needs to know is best obtained in the High Court, with a judge building up as he goes along a corpus of knowledge of the customs and practices and laws of different countries, a judge specialising in this very difficult and delicate business.
All the arguments, it seems to me, are heavily in favour of removing this jurisdiction from the local court, the county court, and handing it over to the High Court. If the hon. Lady can see her way to do this that would meet a great many of the criticisms and misgivings which have been expressed. We have had all the difficulties in doing so deployed today as we did upstairs. People are worried and concerned about this.
I myself feel that the advantages outweigh the disadvantages, and I am prepared to leave it to the wisdom of the court which is making the order, but I think it is very important that, if we do that, we see that the court has adequate knowledge, adequate experience; and to get uniformity of practice and uniformity of decision is best done by leaving this to the High Court. We have left licensing with the Bow Street magistrate, who is a far busier man than


most Chancery judges are, and if he can carry out all the jurisdiction, I feel suit, that the High Court judge could.
Although I am very much in favour of keeping local jurisdiction, and have, indeed, fought hard for it for the welfare of children of divorced parents, I am, for the reasons I have set out, quite convinced that that argument does not weigh in this matter. I think that this is the way in which we shall get uniformity on these important questions, and I hope that the hon. Lady will be able to see her way to accept the Amendment.

Mr. Lipton: I beg to second the Amendment, which has been so effectively moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Widnes (Mr. MacColl). I should like the Joint Under-Secretary of State to take note of two important facts. My hon. Friend supported her in the Division which took place on an Amendment just now. The other point I think it is fair to make is that my hon. Friend is well known to be a strong local authority man, a local government man, and if he takes up the attitude he does on this Amendment he cannot be accused of being one of these centralising types who wants to focus everything in one spot and subject the whole country to some form of centralised dictation.
3.15 p.m.
It is quite true that in respect of adoption by foreigners there is really no significance in the local argument. In other words, it does not seem to me a valid point that a county court in a particular district, just because the prospective adopters happen to be living there, is in a better position than anybody else to decide upon the merits of the application by these foreign visitors.
The Joint Under-Secretary has said that the number of cases involved is likely to be small. In that case they will come easily within the competence of one or the other of the High Court judges. Difficult points of law are likely to arise and in those circumstances a High Court judge is in a much better position to deal with them. It seems to me to be strange that whereas under the licensing system we had a centralised organisation at Bow Street, now that much more effective organised control is envisaged the whole system should be spread out among many county court judges.
The Joint Under-Secretary has also admitted, and we all know, that the prospective parents must reside in this country for six months at least. In those circumstances the prospective parents have no roots in any particular locality. They are not likely, within six months, to provide the local people with such additional information as would justify or necessitate an application for adoption being heard in that locality. The expenses which they are likely to have to meet by having to reside in this country for six months and giving up their jobs and residences abroad are not likely to be added to very largely if the proceedings in which they are involved take place in London.
It is very important, in these early stages, to accumulate a body of experience and a corpus of law competent to handle cases of this kind. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Walsall, North (Mr. W. Wells) made the point in Committee that there was a strong case to be made for uniformity of practice. The best way of ensuring that uniformity is by accepting the Amendment.
The Under-Secretary said that she was prepared to look at this matter again. I do not know whether she has done so, or what conclusions she has reached or whether she is prepared to change her mind on the subject. She pointed out that in the view of the Lord Chancellor it was wise to include both county courts and the High Court as appropriate courts to consider this type of application. But the Lord Chancellor's view is not necessarily binding and immune from reconsideration.
It strikes me as odd that a county court judge is not considered a fit and proper person to try an undefended divorce case where no children are involved but when he has to decide the future of a child for the rest of its natural life he suddenly becomes endowed with the virtues that would have enabled him to deal with undefended divorce cases, with which otherwise he cannot deal, except where he disguises himself as a Commissioner, moves to another court and pretends not to be a county court judge. The whole thing strikes me as being a little odd, and I hope that the Under-Secretary will find it possible to accept this reasonable and practical Amendment.

Mr. Janner: Although the point had been put frankly and with force by my two hon. Friends, I do not think they have covered all the ground. It is important here not only to do the right thing but to make it as obvious as possible to the person who is adopting the child that the right thing is being done. If there ever was an occasion when the dignity of the law and all that goes with it should be used to its fullest extent, this is the occasion.
An assize court, and all that goes with the robing of the judges and so on, is a good tradition and has a substantial effect. In my view, the county court judge, for whom I have a high respect, because he does a great amount of work and serves an extremely useful purpose, is not sufficient. In this case, in order to take every possible precaution, it would be wise for the person who is asking to adopt the child to face the highest tribunal in the country, so that he realises the weight we attach to his application being a genuine one and to its being properly considered.
It may very well be that the county court judge or the sheriff could do this work as well as the High Court judge, but that is not the point. The point is that if a man goes before a county court judge he knows he is appearing before a person who has jurisdiction in an inferior court. Say what you will, that is the position. If he goes before a magistrate or a sheriff, he is not before the High Court of the country and, irrespective of anything else, the fact that an individual has to make his application for this purpose before the highest tribunal in the land will make that individual realise that he is being given a concession which we regard as one of the highest concessions, namely, giving the custody of a child, the life of a child, to a person living outside our country.
I hope that this argument, added to the others which have been advanced, will appeal to the hon. Lady. This is not a trivial point, and it is not a matter of fancy. It goes to the root of the matter with which we are dealing. I am sure the hon. Lady would not want a person to feel that in this matter he had not been dealt with at the highest level. Irrespective of anything else, that point should be brought home to the applicant, and so I sincerely hope, if she has not already made up her mind, that the hon.

Lady will give us an assurance that she will reconsider the position.

The Solicitor-General for Scotland (Mr. William Grant): The hon. Member for Widnes (Mr. MacColl) moved this Amendment in his usual attractive fashion, but I submit to the House that the arguments in favour of it, although possessing certain attractions, have only superficial attractions, and that, indeed, the strength of the argument is the other way.
I appreciate that in England the licensing system up to now has been centralised. We have not in Scotland had the same centralisation. Any sheriff within whose jurisdiction an applicant or child has been living has had jurisdiction, and we have had no trouble in that respect. I am against centralisation, and if I can bring a little attractive breath of decentralisation south of the Border into England, I think it will be a very good thing. We have had a licensing system operating in many cases where no local inquiries or no extensive local inquiries had to be made but in which the applicant very often was residing abroad.
Under the new system, we will have the applicant residing for six months in, say, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, in Wales or in South-West England, and extensive local inquiries will have to be made there. As my hon. Friend pointed out earlier, what we want to do and what the court will want to do is to ensure that the potentional adopter is a reliable person, and that must, to a large extent, depend on the inquiries made during the six months while that person is residing in this country. There will be inquiries abroad, and there will be matters of foreign law. So far as foreign law is concerned, it will be the duty of the guardian ad litem to deal with that in his report to the court.
The county court judge, with the experience which he has already gained of adoption law and procedure, and of assessing the reliability of the potential adopters, is really much better qualified than, or at least equally well qualified as, a High Court judge. When one comes to the question of expense and inconvenience, we must remember that we should have the children's officer brought from wherever the applicant has been residing and the guardian ad litem having to come and give evidence at great


inconvenience. After all, in the High Court in England and in the Court of Session in Scotland, the expenses are very much higher than in a lower court.
Accordingly, from the point of view of the experience already gained by county court judges and sheriffs, on the score of expense and inconvenience, and because of the fact that so many inquiries will have to be made locally, I would suggest that the applicant should, as is provided in the Bill as it now stands, have the option of going to a local court.

Mr. W. Wells: May I ask the right hon. and learned Gentleman whether he attaches any importance to the establishment of a standard procedure and practice in this matter?

The Solicitor-General for Scotland: That really is a question of uniformity, and I had intended to mention it. I certainly agree that uniformity is a very desirable thing, but in adoption cases we have had no real trouble on the score of the lack of uniformity. Equally, I think that under this new procedure there will be no trouble. After all, the original adoption procedure was a new procedure at one stage, and there was no real difficulty in getting reasonable uniformity between the various judges who dealt with it. Equally, I do not see that we need fear any lack of uniformity under this Bill.

Amendment negatived.

3.30 p.m.

Miss Hornsby-Smith: I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
We have had a very full and interesting debate today on a subject which, when introducing the Bill a short time ago, my right hon. Friend commended to hon. Members as one in which all hon. Members would show their interest. He expressed the conviction that all who would contribute to the discussions of the Bill would be animated by a common sympathy with the many children whose lives we hoped would be made happier and more secure as a result of the Measure. I am sure that all those who have taken part in the discussion or who have followed the proceedings will agree that my right hon. Friend's conviction has been amply justified.
There has been a very sincere controversy on certain items, but on all sides

of the House we have had a common intent, to provide children, in the main deprived of their natural home and family life, with as near an alternative within a family as we possibly could.
The Bill has substantially benefited from the co-operative manner in which hon. Members have joined together to try to make that neat balance between parent and child, and between the many other considerations which we have had to view. I am very grateful to my hon. Friends and to right hon. Gentlemen opposite for the help and co-operation which they have given us in our labours. All sides of the House have been inspired by very great sincerity and conviction.
Inevitably, the broad principles of the Bill have commanded general assent. There have been certain items and certain Clauses on which they have been differences, but I believe that the Bill is a good one. It is a Measure which will add still further to the reforms which have become a tradition of this country in the care and welfare of children.
I want to say again with what joy and pleasure my distinguished constituent, the late Sir Gerald Hurst, would have welcomed the Bill. Had he been alive today, he would have been sitting in the Gallery listening to the debate.
We can be very proud and happy about the sympathetic support and help which the Bill has had from all sides of the House. It is not often given to Governments, even the best of them, to see their labours greeted with all-party support and when that event occurs, it is a very pleasurable occasion and one on which one is entitled to enjoy mutual satisfaction.
It is the impact of legislation on human lives which is our primary concern. The Bill will have a good impact and will endure throughout the lives of many children deprived of their natural home and it will benefit them in providing warm and happy family life with, so far as we have been able to arrange, those safeguards which hon. Members quite rightly desired.

3.34 p.m.

Mr. W. Wells: This was a good Bill on Second Reading, and the hon. Lady is to be congratulated on the fact that it is an even better one on Third Reading. She has steered through a very


difficult and technical matter with great courage as well as great skill.
I want to mention two or three respects in which the Bill has been improved, by co-operation with both sides of the House, although largely in response to specific Amendments put down by hon. Members on this side. There were two Amendments to Clause 3, one cutting out indefinite exemptions from giving notice and the other, which the Government have moved today, to Clause 3 (5), reducing to three months from six months the period allowed for the return without notice of children who had previously been in care.
The most important Amendment in Part II of the Bill is that to Clause 18, which now gives the court a wider discretion to dispense with the consent of a parent who has failed in his obligations to the child, if the court thinks that that is in the interests and for the welfare of the child. We also warmly welcome the Amendment to Clause 19, in respect of medical certificates, and hope that the rule to which the hon. Lady referred will provide that in all cases some sort of medical evidence will be brought before the court.
I turn from that rather happy aspect to one which is slightly less happy. It is a fundamental criticism that we have had insufficient time for discussion. That fact was manifested in the debate on Clause 24 today. There have been widespread expressions of anxiety from local authorities, adoption societies and individuals experienced in adoption about the changes which are being made in respect of foreign adoptions. The hon. Lady will have taken full note that in the Division which took place a few minutes ago we voted with her.
On the whole we welcome the substitution of the Clause 24 procedure for the old procedure under Section 40 of the principal Act. But anxieties have been expressed by hon. Members both in respect of sending children to adopters whose suitability the courts cannot completely assess, and, on the other hand, in respect of the fact that the abolition of the licensing procedure may prevent children from going to adopters who have close ties with them or with their natural parents because they, the adopters, have insufficient means or opportunity to come to this country for the qualifying period

in order to obtain a provisional adoption order.
These two sets of anxiety have been pressed home from many quarters upon hon. Members on both sides of the House, and other points have been raised in correspondence with many hon. Members. We have had to concentrate our attention on only a few of the most important ones, however, and I think that we all part with Clause 24 with a feeling that we should have liked further time for its consideration.
In the Second Reading debate the Home Secretary said:
We look forward to any constructive suggestions which hon. Members may care to make with a view to improving the Bill. This is a human problem and one on which we wish to enlist the co-operation of hon. Members."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 27th June, 1958; Vol. 590, c. 747.]
The hon. Lady has carried out her task admirably, in the spirit of those words, but the right hon. Gentleman, who has very great experience of life in Opposition—and may soon have it again—should realise that between 27th June and 25th July we have had to deal with a matter of this kind, where there is a great volume of public anxiety and where the issues at stake are very often rather technical and involve going through a great deal of previous legislation in order to make sure that we are appreciating the point correctly and also involve the examination of many points of view and the obtaining of information from many sources. We had all this to do between 27th June and 25th July, and the Bill has had to go through all its stages in that time. This has not really given us, as an Opposition, or hon. Members in their private capacity, the time or the scope in which to make all the changes to the Bill that ought, perhaps, to be made.
What is even more important is that it makes the local authorities and adoption societies, who have points of view to express, feel that this House has been unable to give full consideration to those points of view. Quite frankly, we have not been able to do that. We have not had sufficient time, and the reason for our not having sufficient time is that the Government introduced, earlier in the year, a lot of contentious legislation. The result has been that we have not had enough time to do full justice to this Bill, which we all welcome.
Having said that, let me repeat that this is a good Bill. We shall watch its enactment with pleasure, we shall follow its subsequent development with close interest and attention, and we hope that when the Government bring in the consolidating Measure for which we pressed on Second Reading, and which has now been promised at an early date, they will look very carefully at any opportunities there may be to make the procedural amendments that will further improve the machinery of this Measure.

3.42 p.m.

Mr. Page: I wish to put on record that, although I should be doubtful about supporting a Bill that includes. Clause 24 as it now stands, I am quite certain that I can give no support at all to a Bill that includes Clause 18 (3). For me, all the other goods points of the Bill are completely destroyed by that subsection (3), which deprives parents of their natural rights.
I would not, at this hour, seek to divide the House on Third Reading, although I may tell my hon. Friend that it did not escape my notice that the total number voting a little while ago would have enabled those who feel so strongly about this Bill to have talked until four o'clock. I still feel very strongly that we are mistaken in including Clause 18 (3); that it will give great pain and suffering to many parents, by depriving them of their parental rights, and I hope that, at some time in the future, that Clause may be amended.

3.43 p.m.

Mrs. L. Jeger: I very much regret that we have so little time for a Third Reading debate. There are still several important points to make, but, as I do not wish to interfere with the timetable, I shall confine myself to one or two observations on Clause 30. We welcome that Clause because it enables local authorities to act more freely than before in the adoption of children. It also empowers the Secretary of State to make the necessary regulations, and I should like to ask him, when he is doing so, to bear in mind the following three points.
Under the present Regulations, an adoption society must have a case committee to confirm each adoption, but many local authorities use only one official

to inspect the home, to choose the child, and to confirm the excellence of his own judgment—and to act, in addition, as guardian ad litem. The whole responsibility is thereby placed on one officer. It is absolutely essential for their success that adoption arrangements should be decided by someone who has played no part in making them. It might, therefore, be advisable, under the regulations, to insist that a local authority also should work through a case committee.
Secondly, I hope that the Secretary of State will encourage local authorities to co-operate with one another. One of the things that makes the unmarried mother, in particular, hesitate to go to her local council, is her fear that, as a result, the child will be placed locally, and that she may, therefore, expose herself to the embarrassment and difficulty of meeting the child. If we could encourage local authorities to do adoptions for one another's children, I am sure that it would be very helpful.
I also hope that the right hon. Gentleman will give some guidance to local authorities about the training of the officers who should do this work. Some authorities use the children's officer, and in certain cases the probation officer is used. Same people think that the year's training given by the Central Council for Children's Care is the right kind of preparation. We need to know a great deal more about the kind of training which should be undertaken by people to whom we are rather glibly entrusting this important work.

3.46 p.m.

Mr. Lipton: I want to go on record in this debate as expressing the view that this Bill has been rushed through the legislative machine, and in that respect I agree with every word which my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Walsall. North (Mr. W. Wells) has said. We have not had adequate time to discuss all the implications of this Bill and, what is more, the Press and the public have not been given a proper opportunity of realising all the dangers implicit in some of the Clauses, particularly Clause 24.
On Second Reading there was some rather superior criticism about the Sunday Pictorial which contained an article pointing out the dangers of Clause 24. It seems to me that the


public would not have known anything about the dangers of Clause 24 to anything like the extent that they should have known but for that article. It certainly brought to the attention of many hon. Members who might otherwise have not realised the dangers the significance of what we are doing in Clause 24.

The Secretary of State for the Home Department and Lord Privy Seal (Mr. R. A. Butler): May I point out that the Hurst Committee's Report was published just four years ago and any hon. Member who wished to study this subject should have done so then?

Mr. Lipton: The interesting point about the Report that appeared four years ago is that the Report did not put forward any proposal on which the Government can claim this Clause ought to be based. If the Home Secretary will look at page 73 of the Hurst Report—I have not got time to go into it as fully as I should like—he will see in paragraph (43):
The licensing system should be maintained in order to provide for the transfer of children to destinations outside 'the British Islands'.
The public were in no way prepared by the contents of this Report for the conclusions to which the Government suddenly came as a result of which it will now be possible, as an hon. Member opposite said, to have export licensing of children provided for by the law of the land for the first time.
I am sure the Government must agree with this point. In Clause 24 we are taking a gamble. The Under-Secretary knows that she is taking a gamble. It has been made clear by Government spokesmen that there were risks involved in this Clause, which the Government thought on balance ought to be taken. I do not mind taking risks at my own expense, but I object to taking risks and gambling with the lives of children. In retrospect I am sure the Government will agree that they have taken a very serious responsibility upon themselves. I do not think this Third Reading ought to be allowed to proceed without some reference being made to this fact.
The Government are taking a gamble on the future of these children and, what is worse, we shall never know whether

this gamble has come off. Even if we did get to know, no one would be able to do anything about it. Goodness knows what tragedy may occur as a result of this, of which we shall never know, but the Government will say, "The Act is working very smoothly. No evidence has been brought to our notice that any child who has been allowed to go abroad is not as happy as any other child in this country." I know that the rest of the Bill makes many useful and desirable provisions, but from my point of view this Bill will always be tainted by the inclusion in it of the Clause which enables child to be exported abroad.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed, with Amendments.

Orders of the Day — WATER BILL [Lords]

As amended (in the Standing Committee), considered.

Clause 2.—(SUPPLYING WATER BY TEMPORARY MEANS DURING A DROUGHT.)

Amendment proposed: In page 4, line 9, after "rate", insert "or minimum charge".—[Miss Vickers.]

Mr. Edward du Cann: I beg to second the Amendment.

3.52 p.m.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government (Mr. J. R. Bevins): I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Devonport (Miss Vickers) for moving this useful Amendment which is acceptable to the Government.

Mr. G. R. Mitchison: I understand that this Amendment provides for some cases which might otherwise have been omitted, and that its effect is little more than drafting.

Amendment agreed to.

First Schedule.—(PROCEDURE FOR MAKING ORDERS.)

Amendments made: In page 7, line 18, after "authority", insert "and river board".

In page 7, line 25, leave out from beginning to end of line 28.—[Mr. Bevins.]

3.53 p.m.

Mr. Bevins: I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
At this hour, I have no wish to inflict a speech on the House which knows perfectly well the contents of this very useful and small Bill, but I should like to pay my tribute to hon. Members on both sides of the House who served on the Standing Committee and who made several useful suggestions for the improvement of the Bill.

3.54 p.m.

Mr. du Cann: In view of the hour, I shall suit my remarks to the time. I should like to pay a tribute to the Government for introducing the Bill and to my hon. and right hon. Friends for the way in which they dealt with it in Committee and accepted a number of suggestions put forward by back benchers on both sides. I will say no more; I hope that my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary will take it all as having been said.
I have one comment about Clause 1 (5), which gives the Minister very wide discretion, as we know, particularly in regard to pollution. There is a conflict of interest here between the river boards, on the one hand, whose proper duty it is to keep rivers clean from pollution—a very difficult job which they do extremely well, and more power to their elbow—and, on the other hand, the local authorities and factory people who have a natural anxiety that they should not

be in jeopardy as a result of the fact that, in three years' time, the protection which they now have is likely to go. These points were made in Committee, and I do not think that it is necessary to expand them now. I ask my hon. Friend to keep them in mind.

3.55 p.m.

Mr. Mitchison: We are glad to see the replacement of Defence Regulations by permanent legislation. We should not be in order at this stage in saying that we wished the Bill had made provision for even other emergencies. So far as it goes, we regard it as a fair compromise between an emergency which does not give time for notice and so forth as fully as one would otherwise wish and the due regard which must be had for the interests of water consumers as against local authorities and other water undertakers who have to cope with an emergency.
Putting it very shortly, the times of notice and so forth are short, but that only goes with the character of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed, with Amendments.

ADJOURNMENT

Resolved, That this House do now adjourn.—[Sir G. Wills.]

Adjourned accordingly at tour minutes to Four o'clock.